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It is widely believed that the regional dynamics in South Asia, characterized by power-
asymmetry and geographical Indo-centricity, make the region a particularly brittle 
strategic environment. In that challenging context, this study seeks to determine why 
regional integration, including the creation of an important role for SAARC (South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation), has been so difficult in South Asia.  
The paper asserts that the power asymmetry between India and other South Asian 
countries has fueled an environment of regional discord, which has adversely affected 
regionalism in South Asia. The conflictual relationships, most prominent between India 
and Pakistan, have manifested in a regional mindset that is highly sensitive to state 
sovereignty and averse to the notion of relinquishing any degree of state sovereignty to a 
supra-national authority, which the European countries successfully accomplished. Such 
a mindset has made it difficult for South Asian countries to properly institutionalize the 
SAARC. The paper concludes that despite the setbacks, the prospects appear positive for 
regional integration in South Asia. But to achieve any meaningful traction in the 
integration process, the onus ultimately lies on SAARC members to change their attitudes 
vis-à-vis each other and soften their respective stances. 
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I. ASYMMETRIC POWER BALANCE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the past four decades of the post–Cold War era, the world has witnessed a 
dramatic surge in the trend of regional cooperation and integration. With many countries 
joining the bandwagon, regionalism venture has indeed been one of the most important 
developments in world politics. Virtually all countries are now members of at least one 
regional grouping, and South Asia is no exception to this worldwide trend.1 As a regional 
entity, South Asia is composed of mainly the sub-Himalayan countries and includes the 
adjoining countries on both sides. The formal regional entity in South Asia, the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), was initially composed of 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. However, the 
membership of the organization expanded after Afghanistan joined as the eighth member 
in 2007. For South Asia, the formation of the SAARC in 1985 was the first 
institutionalized effort in promoting regionalism in the subcontinent. Yet, after almost 
three decades of its existence, the organization still gropes for ways to fulfill its mandates 
of regional prosperity and development, and South Asia remains as divided as ever, 
mired in intractable inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhary 
succinctly puts the dilemma in perspective when she states, “In South Asia the past 
remains the present and the leaders of the constituent countries are more comfortable in 
their dealings with countries from outside the region than they are among themselves.”2 
Rafiq Dossani et al. further points out that “it is almost as if South Asia does not exist as 
a region at all, or that it lives only in the memories of those who remember or study 
colonial times.”3  
1 Kishore C. Dash, Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures (New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 3. 
2 Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, SAARC at Crossroads: The Fate of Regional Cooperation in South 
Asia (New Delhi: Samskriti, 2006), xiv.  
3 Rafiq Dossani, Daniel C. Sneider, and Vikram Sood, “Does South Asia Exist,” in Does South Asia 
Exist?: Prospects for Regional Integration, eds. Rafiq Dossani, Daniel C. Sneider, and Vikram Sood 
(Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2010), 15. 
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It is widely believed that the regional dynamics in South Asia, characterized by 
power-asymmetry and geographical Indo-centricity, make the region a particularly brittle 
strategic environment.4 In that challenging context, this study seeks to determine why 
regional integration, including the creation of an important role for the SAARC, has been 
so difficult in South Asia. Additionally, the study aims to examine the prospect for 
regionalism in South Asia and draw policy recommendations in this regard. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
With more than one-fifth of humanity,5 South Asia garners importance in the 
world arena by virtue of its sheer demographic versatility and potential. As home to 27 
percent of the world’s population, the region is the most populous and the densest 
geographical region in the world. Such a concentration of population will always be 
important, whatever its circumstances, for world affairs. By virtue of its enormous 
population, the region can become an important reservoir of labor-intensive enterprise. It 
is also the second fastest growing region in the world after East Asia.6 The remarkable 
growth of India since the country’s economic reforms of the early 1990s has particularly 
enhanced the economic potential of the region. As the world’s largest democracy and the 
tenth largest economy, India has attracted global attention as an emerging economic 
powerhouse. Hence, South Asia promises to play a significant role in the global politics 
and economy.  
On the downside, South Asia raises global concerns as a region beset with chronic 
instability and economic disintegration. Christian Wagner asserts that “the region 
continues to be one of the most important crisis regions in the 21st century.”7 The 
4 Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, South Asia after the Cold War: International Perspectives, 
eds. Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press., 1993), 4. 
5 Compared to a 7 billion-plus world population, the South Asian population was estimated at 1.61 
billion in 2013, which amounts to 27% of the world’s population (source: The World Bank, “Data: South 
Asia,” 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/region/SAS. 
6 Ejaz Ghani, ed., The Poor Half Billion in South Asia: What Is Holding Back Lagging Regions (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.  
7 Christian Wagner, Security Cooperation in South Asia: Overview, Reasons, Prospects (SWP 
Research Paper) (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik, German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, 2014), 5–22, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/
2014_RP06_wgn.pdf. 
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region’s instability becomes more worrying due to the potential spillover effects in other 
parts of the world. Most of the instability in the region comes from widespread poverty. 
South Asia contains more of the world’s poor—500 million people—than any other 
region, even Sub-Saharan Africa.8 It is worrying that the number of people living in 
poverty has actually increased in a region that is growing so rapidly.9 In South Asia, 
nearly 600 million people live on less than US$1.25 a day, more than 250 million 
children are undernourished, and more than 30 million children do not go to school.10 
Instability also arises from the fact that the region suffers from terrorism, often fueled by 
ethnic, secessionist conflicts and religious extremism.11 Instability coming out of poverty 
and conflicts has required substantial investment of global resources in terms of refugee 
assistance, food programs, peacekeeping and stabilization support, and development 
assistance.  
The imperative to understand South Asia has further increased due to the overt 
introduction of the nuclear dimension in the region. The two principal antagonists in the 
region, India and Pakistan, openly acknowledged their nuclear prowess in 1998. Such 
developments have raised global concerns for rightful reasons, as many analysts fear that 
the possibility of a nuclear showdown between the two adversaries cannot be altogether 
disregarded, given the nature of their animosity and the geo-political imperatives of the 
two countries. U.S. President Bill Clinton’s remark about Kashmir being “the most 
dangerous place on earth” during his visit to the region in March 2000 was based not on 
an evaluation of day-to-day security threats faced by people in Kashmir, but on the 
concern of the potential nuclear exchange that would have far-reaching effects.12     
A study in regionalism in South Asia assumes significance because of the 
historical and geo-political imperatives of the region, which intertwine the destinies of 
South Asian nations with each other. People in South Asia share deep-rooted social and 
8 Ghani, The Poor Half Billion, xv.   
9 Ibid., 1. 
10 Ibid., 2.  
11 Wagner, “Security Cooperation in South Asia,” 5.  
12 Terence Hunt, “President-Wallah: India Is the Jewel in U.S. Leader’s Asia Trip,” Guardian, March 
20, 2000. 
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cultural linkages that transcend borders. Bimal Prasad argues, “Indeed, it is possible even 
to talk of South Asia as a definite cultural unit on the world map.”13 These dynamics 
make it a daunting prospect, if not an impossible one, for a South Asian country to 
develop and prosper on its own. An individualistic venture may even prove futile in 
consideration of the region’s geo-political imperatives. A South Asian country, on its 
own, does not possess sufficient institutional and infrastructural capacities for sustainable 
development and growth. Hence, it can be argued that, for the region to make any 
headway, a collective endeavor is needed. As Peter Katzenstein describes, “Collective 
regional action, or regionalism, enhances each member state’s development and 
security.”14 The potential has been proven in European integration, where effective 
institutionalization of regionalism has contributed to peace and economic prosperity in 
the aftermath of the Second World War.  
Furthermore, understanding the role of India in regional integration in South Asia 
assumes both regional and global significance because of the Indo-centric nature of the 
region and India’s growing global influence. Many observers believe that India has huge 
potential and means to take a meaningful leadership role in the region. But so far, this has 
not happened because India continues to have conflicting relationships with its neighbors. 
Such conflictual relationships have undermined India’s regional status and raised 
questions about the nation’s ability to assume leadership in the region. To make matters 
worse, many analysts blame India’s highhandedness on regional affairs for the failure of 
regionalism in South Asia. For India, these dynamics may prove counterproductive to its 
regional and global aspirations.   
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In South Asia, it appears regional integration has not succeeded largely because of 
the power asymmetry between India and its neighbors, which has induced conflicting 
relationships and a lack of trust among the South Asian countries.  
13 Bimal Prasad, “Prospects for Greater Cooperation in South Asia,” in The Dynamics of South Asia: 
Regional Cooperation and SAARC, eds. Eric Gonsalves and Nancy Jetly (New Delhi: Sage, 1999), 71. 
14 Peter Katzenstein, “Regionalism and Asia,” New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 353–70. 
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There is a sense of déjà vu in the regional dynamics of South Asia because the 
same issues continue to stand out prominently as key factors responsible for sustaining 
the environment of discord and impeding regional cooperation. The asymmetrical power 
balance manifest with Indian hegemonic aspirations and outright defiance from its 
neighbors, especially Pakistan, remains a key attribute to the environment of discord. The 
Indo-centric nature of the stand-off demonstrates that regionalism has mainly failed in 
South Asia due to the ambivalent attitude of the presumed regional hegemon towards the 
concept and the inherent mistrust and suspicion shared by the smaller countries towards 
it. The solution, hence, seems to be largely normative: that both India and its smaller 
neighbors should undergo a change in their attitude vis-à-vis each other. They should be 
able to forego their differences for the sake of the larger benefits that regional integration 
can bring. Recent developments, which seem to point out that the regional actors may be 
having a positive change in attitude towards regional cooperation, are certainly 
encouraging but still a distant prospect. 
Regional integration efforts in South Asia have not worked well both for political 
and economic reasons. However, political imperatives seem to take precedence over 
economic factors in explaining the lack of regional cooperation in South Asia. Bimal 
Prasad asserts that “the basic factor behind the slow growth of regional cooperation in 
South Asia is not economic, but political.”15 If political differences can be overcome or 
set aside by member states, then the region constitutes an ideal grouping for economic 
integration.16 The political dimensions are mainly overshadowed with security concerns 
among member states vis-à-vis their neighbors, which, some observers argue, have been 
exaggerated to protect vested interests of political elites of the region.17 With more focus 
on perceived external threats, domestic politics rooted in nationalism have largely 
downplayed internal security threats, such as poverty, government corruption, and 
inequitable growth.18    
15 Prasad, “Prospects for Greater Cooperation in South Asia,” 64. 
16 Muchkund Dubey, “Regional Economic Integration in South Asia: The Development of Institutions 
and the Role of Politics,” in Does South Asia Exist, 53. 
17 Rajiv Kumar, “Is a Successful SAARC an Imperative for India?” in Does South Asia Exist, 110. 
18 Ibid. 
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In South Asia, the Indo-centric asymmetric power balance has raised security 
concerns among the smaller states leading to mistrust and suspicion of Indian motives. In 
such a scenario, one can argue that regional cooperation has certainly been a problematic 
affair. As Feroz Khan asserts, “In this asymmetric environment, security concerns are the 
primary obstacle to [regional] integration.”19 India is considerably superior in geographic 
size, economic resources, and military capabilities than the other SAARC countries.20 
This disparity has raised security concerns among the smaller countries of the region: 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives. Furthermore, it has led to 
a paradox in which, on the one hand, India seeks to be the regional security provider and 
wants the other countries of the region to cooperate with it in keeping external strategic 
interests and influences out of the region; while on the other hand, the other smaller 
powers view India as the main source of threat to their security and welcomes external 
powers’ interests and activities in the region to offset what they presume to be India’s 
hegemonic aspirations.21 Nepal’s more-than-occasional tryst with China, Sri Lanka’s 
quest for close ties with China and certain Western powers, and Pakistan’s close and 
strong ties with China shows the apprehension of the smaller countries vis-à-vis India.22  
The resultant interstate discords continue to raise security concerns, forcing 
regionalism to take a backseat in South Asia. Ansau Chaudhary concedes that “nagging 
bilateral disputes have remained major roadblocks in the path of regional cooperation in 
South Asia.”23 The nature of discord ranges from inherited conflicts over disputed 
territories, cross-border movements, and distribution of resources, and creates a legacy of 
distrust among the SAARC nations.24 Again, India takes the central position in this 
mayhem, as almost all the countries in the region have some outstanding disputes with 
19 Feroz Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism in South Asia,” in Does South Asia Exist, 227. 
20 To put it in perspective, India is geographically bigger in size than all other six initial SAARC 
countries put together.  
21 Prasad, “Prospects for Greater Cooperation in South Asia,” 72.  
22 Ibid.    
23 Chaudhury, SAARC at Crossroads, 145.  
24 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism, 227. 
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their biggest neighbor.25 Khan argues, “India, in effect, serves as a hub of power to 
weaker nations, all of which have long-standing problems to resolve with it.26  
Of course, the inter-state dynamics are dominated by the Indo-Pak rivalry. The 
enduring rivalry between the two members with the highest potential for bilateral trade 
remains a major issue. Many observers believe that the Indo-Pakistan dynamics have 
effectively kept the SAARC a hostage in pursuing its objectives of regional prosperity 
and harmony. The strategic competition between the two biggest countries of the region 
has been long and protracted with seemingly irreconcilable core issues. Khan asserts, “No 
regional dispute in contemporary times has involved the investment of so much human 
and economic capital.”27 Both the countries are focused on increasing its military 
advantage vis-à-vis the other, thus pulling the region into a vortex of security dilemma. 
The overt display of their nuclear capabilities has further exacerbated the situation and 
raised global concerns. 
India’s role in promoting regionalism, as the largest country in the region, has 
arguably been minimal. In effect, India has shown an ambivalent attitude bordering on 
indifference towards regional integration efforts in South Asia. To make matters worse, 
many analysts point out India’s highhandedness in dealing with its smaller neighbors as a 
major impediment in regional cooperation, as the smaller powers in the region feel they 
are being sidelined to subsidiary roles in regional affairs. In defiance, the smaller 
countries refuse to recognize India as the regional leader and come up with their own 
knee-jerk reactions to any Indian attempts at regional dominance. Prasad describes the 
phenomenon as “anti-Indianism,” which he concedes has always been latent among the 
elites of India’s neighbors.28  
Two factors seem to have fueled Indian indifference towards regionalism. The 
first involves Indian global ambitions, which make the country feel that it needs the 
25 Chaudhury, SAARC at Crossroads, 145. 
26 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism,” 227.  
27 Ibid., 230.  
28 Prasad, “Prospects for Greater Cooperation in South Asia,” 71.  
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world more than it needs South Asia.29 Hence, India sees its national interests better 
served with interactions with the rest of the world, particularly the richer countries, than 
with its immediate neighbors. The second factor involves Indian apprehension of regional 
cooperation as a threat to its national interests. As Rajiv Kumar puts it, “For years, the 
Indian security and foreign policy establishment viewed SAARC as a mechanism to help 
its smaller neighbors to compete against it more effectively, thus denying India its 
rightful place in the regional and global polity and undermining India’s national 
interests.”30 
Mistrust and suspicion among countries in South Asia can also be linked back to 
the legacy of the region’s colonial past. Many analysts believe that the colonial past has 
made South Asian countries pre-fixated in the notion of state sovereignty. Anasua 
Chaudhury explains, “The colonial past of the region and the subsequent partitions of the 
sub-continent in the wake of the ouster of colonial powers, have left South Asian 
countries with a ‘somewhat rigid mindset.”31 Such mindset has resulted in pre-fixation on 
state sovereignty and reluctance to embrace the wider concept of supra-nationalism, 
which the European Union countries successfully accomplished. For India, the colonial 
legacy might have had an inadvertent effect, where it views itself as the rightful successor 
of the British Raj, which obliges it to assume leadership in the region. Saubhagya Shah 
aptly describes the Indian aspiration towards the inheritance of colonial legacy as 
“Legacy Raj Syndrome.”32 Thus, in spite of the common colonial history, geographical 
proximity, and similar social and cultural traits, the new nation-states in South Asia 
started their journey with mistrust and animosity toward one another, because they saw 
each other as potential threats to their newfound sovereignty and freedom.33 
29 Sood et al., Does South Asia Exist?, 32. 
30 Kumar, “Is a Successful SAARC an Imperative for India?” 107. 
31 Chaudhury, SAARC at Crossroads, 143. 
32 Saubhagya Shah, “A Himalayan Red Herring?: Maoist Revolution in the Shadow of the Legacy 
Raj,” in Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, ed. Michael Hutt (London: Hurst and Co., 
2005), 195. 
33 Chaudhury, SAARC at Crossroads, 143. 
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With these mindsets, it seems that the countries of South Asia have become 
averse to the idea of relinquishing any degree of state sovereignty as a trade-off for 
regional integration. Chaudhury points out that “to achieve regional integration, the 
political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”34 The European Union was 
largely successful because it was able to embrace the concept of supra-nationalism by 
partially surrendering individual national sovereignty, which helped the European Union 
achieve regional cooperation and emerge as a very unique model of integration.35 In 
South Asia, this has yet to happen. 
The regional dynamics of power asymmetry have adversely affected the role of 
the SAARC, too. Firstly, the strategic backdrop behind the genesis of the SAARC was 
different. Unlike other regional organizations that grew largely out of a necessity to 
counter outside threats, the SAARC was initially conceived as a strategy of smaller 
countries of the region headed by Bangladesh to counter the growing military strength 
and influence of India. As Chaudhury asserts, “To offset India’s growing power and 
influence in the region, smaller countries [of South Asia] came closer and went for 
setting up of the SAARC.”36 Secondly, the SAARC began its journey with a bumpy start 
because the two large regional stakeholders, India and Pakistan, were not part of the 
initial steps of its formation. In their paranoia, both countries found the concept of the 
SAARC detrimental to their national interests. Chaudhury explains, “The attempt to 
establish a regional organization in South Asia was perceived by both India and Pakistan 
to be a handiwork of their respective enemy number one.”37 India’s apprehension is also 
reflected in the preconditions that New Delhi made for its ascension to the organization, 
which required that all decisions be unanimous and bilateral issues not be discussed. 
34 Ibid., 131. 
35 Ibid., 133. 
36 Ibid., 61. 
37 Ibid., 63. 
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These provisions have made the decision-making process a problematic affair, resulting 
in the organization’s relegation to a very nominal role.  
Despite the setbacks, the prospect of regionalism looks promising in South Asia. 
The growing realization among South Asian countries about the strategic and economic 
benefits of regional cooperation, and most importantly, the rise of India in global 
strategic and economic fronts, are strong indicators to that end. Yet the South Asian 
countries will have to overcome many hurdles to succeed in the endeavor. Overcoming 
the omnipresent mistrust and suspicion among each other is a significant challenge. To 
this end, the role of India will arguably be crucial in determining the future of South Asia. 
Rafiq Dossani et al. points out that “in most of the successful examples of regionalism, a 
major regional anchor played an important role in bringing countries together, at least in 
integration’s early days.”38 The authors continue, “Germany’s leadership was crucial to 
European regionalism, Indonesia’s to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and the United States’ to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).39 The region’s geo-politics strongly suggest that India is the best candidate for 
the job. As the world’s largest democracy and a major economic player, it has the 
potential and means to lead the region. If India assumes a positive and genial leadership 
role, it is very likely that other countries of South Asia will join hands in support of 
regionalism.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Due to its growing prominence and importance in global affairs, South Asia has 
attracted a substantial amount of academic interest into its regional affairs. As a result, 
academic books and articles analyzing the region have multiplied over the years.40 
Similarly, there are again a plethora of literatures analyzing regionalism in other parts of 
the world, such as Europe, Latin America, and South-East Asia. These studies are equally 
38 Sood et al., Does South Asia Exist, 30 
39 Ibid., 31. 
40 In addition to scholarly literatures, the region also attracts a fair amount of periodic reviews by 
international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the various offices 
associated with the United Nations, and the SAARC itself.  
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worthwhile, providing valuable insight into regional experiences as success stories or, in 
some cases, futile experiences.  
I have embarked upon my research work with a cursory look into the theoretical 
approaches to the concepts of regionalism and regional integration. The theories present 
many views and conceptual models of regional integration. It seems the models may not 
be tailor-made to suit all eventualities, and for South Asia, the regional academics and 
policy makers will have to build on the existing models to suit the region’s purpose. A 
plethora of literatures shares the view that the Indo-centric asymmetrical power balance is 
essentially sustaining the environment of discord in South Asia. Yet putting all the blame 
on India may not be completely justified, because other regional actors appear equally 
responsible for fueling mistrust and suspicion. Many literatures also identify the key role 
that a hegemonic power can play. In South Asia, it remains to be seen whether India can 
successfully take up that responsibility. More importantly, it needs to be determined 
whether India really wants to take the helm in the regional integration efforts. Literatures 
also emphasize the role of external actors in promoting regionalism. In the South Asian 
scenario, there seems to be a relative lack of outside interest in this regard, which 
ironically can be attributed to the inclination of South Asian countries to deal with 
external powers on individual basis. Literatures have also identified the possible 
psychological impacts of the colonial past on South Asian countries. These historical 
analyses are also important in gaining relevant insight into the evolution of regional 
dynamics in South Asia.  
Many scholars have put forth their view on what constitutes regional cooperation 
and integration. E.B. Haas defines the concept of integration as “forming parts into a 
whole or creating interdependence.”41 Haas further explains, 
The study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and 
why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily 
mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual 
41 E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces (London: Stevens, 1958), 
610. 
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attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving 
conflicts between themselves.42 
According to Charles Pentland, “International political integration is a process 
whereby a group of people, organized initially in two or more independent nation-states, 
come to constitute a political whole which can be termed as a community.”43 As such, 
regional integration may encompass political, economic, scientific, military, or any other 
similar dimensions.44  
Theorists are divided into two groups in approaching international integration: 
state and community model. The state-model emphasizes the need to have an overarching 
constitutional provisions or a superordinate authority for a system to be integrated.45 The 
concept calls for relinquishment of a certain degree of state sovereignty as trade-off for 
supra-nationality. The community-model “puts more stress on the character of the 
relationship between the people—both the elite and the general public—in the process of 
integration.”46 This approach is based on the belief that by relying more on the growth of 
certain common values, perceptions, and habits, nation-states can form a community 
without relinquishing its sovereign factor.47 Regional actors in South Asia have not 
formally adopted any of the models as described. Yet achieving cooperation through the 
community-model stands out as more feasible for the region because there is no 
constraint to state-sovereignty.   
The correlation between the Indo-centric asymmetric power structure and the 
environment of discord in the region is identified in most literatures. According to Feroz 
Khan, “key factors [that impede regional cooperation and integration] include India’s 
42 Chaudhury, SAARC at Crossroads, 6. 
43 Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber 
Limited, 1973), 21. 
44 Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Integration (Stanford: Princeton University 
Press, 1971), 10–11. 




                                                 
asymmetric size and power, relative to the other South Asian states.”48 On a harsher note, 
Ummu Salma Bava concludes that “in the absence of an equal other, India is seen as a 
bully against which the small states rally.”49 The Indian preponderance in regional affairs 
has created debates over the role of India and her relationship with her surrounding states, 
and how the interaction between them is fraught with mistrust and suspicion. The 
prospect of regional integration looks bleak because the security situation is exacerbated 
when the smaller powers seek to defy Indian leadership. In his book Regionalism in 
South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures, Kishore C. Dash suggests 
that the reluctance of other South Asian countries to recognize India as the leader of the 
region is one of the causes behind the failure of regional integration in South Asia.50  
A number of literatures discuss the role of a benevolent hegemonic power in 
promoting regionalism. Kishore C. Dash suggests that a region can experience an 
enhanced level of regionalism with the presence of a benevolent hegemonic power vis-à-
vis sans one.51 The argument behind such an assertion is that the benevolent hegemon 
can serve as an institutional focal point in the coordination of rules and policies. On the 
other hand, “absence of hegemonic leadership leads to coordination dilemma and can 
make coordination a problematic affair.”52 This leads to the question of whether India is 
ready to assume the leadership role as a benevolent hegemon and, more importantly, 
whether other countries of the region are willing to accept Indian leadership.  
In this context, India’s role as potential hegemonic power in South Asia remains a 
matter of scrutiny and debate. While conceding that India’s role is crucial to the region, 
Feroz Khan points out that India’s priority lies in leveraging its growing economic and 
military strength to achieve regional political dominance. On a positive note, he also 
reasons that “India’s centrality is probably inevitable. Properly used, the power implied 
48 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism,” 227.  
49 Ummu Salma Bava, “Regional Integration: Lessons for South Asia from around the Word,” in Does 
South Asia Exist, 50. 
50 Kishore C. Dash, Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures 
(New York: Routledge, 2008). 
51 Dash, Regionalism in South Asia, 110. 
52 Ibid. 
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by India’s position can be a strong and positive force for development.”53 Ummu Bava 
points out India can play a positive and constructive role in the region’s betterment by 
“capitalizing on the asymmetry to leverage a new political identity that is based on power 
of vision, not size.”54 She further asserts, “Geographically, India is the region’s pivotal 
state. It is also the anchor of democracy. As such, it should reach out to its neighbors and 
engage them on the basis of non-reciprocity of action to construct a greater unity.”55 This 
school of thought is also reflected in the contributing works of Kanti Bajpai and Pervaiz 
Iqbal Cheema in The Dynamics of South Asia: Regional Cooperation and SAARC. They 
take an optimistic view for regionalism in South Asia, which they attribute to India’s 
growing realization of the importance of regional cooperation, and a gradual decline in its 
apprehension towards regionalism.56 They make the case that both India and other 
countries should incorporate a change in attitudes towards each other. India should learn 
to play a more generous role, and her neighbors have to understand that “unreasonable 
demands cannot be justified by harping on asymmetry.”57 
In addition to India’s potential role, regionalism arguably failed to gain 
momentum in South Asia due to the relative lack of outside interest in the region, 
especially from the United States. Literatures on the European Union (EU) fundamentally 
point out that apart from the historical, political, and economic imperatives that helped 
foster the European Union, the role of the United States was crucial in giving impetus to 
the nascent organization in Western Europe. William Wallace points out in Regional 
Integration: The West European Experience that “the role of the United States as external 
hegemon and security guarantor was a crucial factor in the evolution of the European 
Community (EC).”58 He explains that in the aftermath of the Second World War, “U.S. 
53 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism,” 236.  
54 Bava, “Regional Integration: Lessons for South Asia from around the Word,” in Does South Asia 
Exist, 50. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Eric Gonsalves and Nancy Jetly, eds., The Dynamics of South Asia: Regional Cooperation and 
SAARC (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999).  
57 Ibid., 12. 
58 William Wallace, Regional Integration: The West European Experience (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institutions, 1994), 8. 
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interests helped to contain Germany, the potential regional hegemon, which in turn 
boosted confidence of European countries especially France to build relationship with the 
then Federal Germany that became a driving force in European Integration.”59 How can 
South Asia generate sufficient outside interest as a regional entity is not clearly defined in 
most literatures. However, it can be discerned that the lack of outside interest is due to 
India’s aversion towards outside intervention in South Asian affairs and other countries’ 
inability to forge a collective agenda to present to the more influential outside world.  
Scholarly analyses also focus on the fixation of South Asian countries in the 
politics of sovereignty in the Westphalian sense of statehood,60 which has so far 
overshadowed the well-endowed politics of supra-nationalism in South Asia. Literatures 
on regional integration of the European Union suggest that that for regionalism to 
succeed and prosper, constituent nation-states should be flexible and prepared to 
compromise at least in part on state sovereignty. Ummu Bava points out that “in Europe 
the integration efforts sought to write a new history for the region that expanded notions 
of state sovereignty and borders, and proposed to share or pool sovereignty.”61 Some 
analysts attribute the South Asian reticence to shed sovereignty to the region’s colonial 
past. Anasau Chaduhary points out that “the nation-building process and the concomitant 
national security perspective in the post-colonial era have shaped the concept of 
sovereignty in [South Asia] in a peculiar manner which seems to be antithetical to the 
concept of supra-nationality.”62 Chaudhary further highlights that “the colonial past of 
the region and the disputes emerging mainly out of the past have clouded the vision of 
cooperation in the region.”63  
Literatures on South Asia also suggest that provisions in the SAARC’s charter, 
which prohibit discussions on bilateral issues and require all decisions to be unanimous, 
59 Wallace, Regional Integration: The West European Experience, 8. 
60 The concept of Westphalian sovereignty recognizes that all nation-states have sovereignty over their 
territory, with no role for external agents in domestic structures. The concept came into being after the 
“Peace of Westphalia” treaty was signed in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe.  
61 Bava, “Regional Integration: Lessons for South Asia,” in Does South Asia Exist, 41. 
62 Chaudhury, SAARC at Crossroads, 148. 
63 Ibid.  
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have relegated the organization to an ineffective and nominal role. As described 
previously, these provisions were ratified due to the unavoidable circumstances that the 
nascent organization faced in its initial phases. Over the years, its self-imposed restraint 
of precluding bilateral contentious issues has inadvertently created obstacles for the 
SAARC to grow and become more relevant. As inter-state disputes remain extant, the 
relevancy of the SAARC becomes an issue. Ross Masson Hussain points out that the 
“SAARC is being hard put to avoiding consideration of vital regional political and 
strategic questions as the organization possesses greater potential for defusing tensions 
and generating political goodwill in South Asia.”64  
In relating the decision-making process in the SAARC with the EU and ASEAN, 
Chaudhary acknowledges that the SAARC’s practice of unanimity differs from the latter 
organizations. She explains that decision-making in ASEAN forum is guided by the 
practice of Musyawarah (consultation) and Muafakat (consensus).65 In the EU, the 
organization has come up with an ingenious method of majority voting, which has made 
the decision-making process much simpler and smoother. However, Chaudhary points 
out that the EU’s adoption of the method only came after going through its own spate of 
frustration as it had also initially imposed unanimity in decision-making process.66 
Although it becomes evident that the current SAARC practice of decision-making is 
inefficient, it is unclear how the SAARC can overcome the dilemma of its decision-
making process. Because other regional counterparts were finally able to agree on a 
mechanism that works relatively well and suits the interest of all stakeholders, the 
SAARC should try to work out a more suitable mechanism, too. But again, the answer 
lies in the willingness of regional actors, especially India, to show the initiative.  
 
64 Ross Masood Hussain, “SAARC 1985–1995: A Review and Analysis of Progress,” in The 
Dynamics of South Asia: Regional Cooperation and SAARC, 35. 
65 Chaudhury, SAARC at Crossroads, 74. 
66 Ibid., 80. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
I intend to employ a combination of historical and comparative approach to 
analyze the proposed research question. The regional dynamics that we find in South 
Asia are, to a large extent, the outcome of the legacy of the colonial past and subsequent 
geo-politics of the region. As such, South Asian countries have developed a distinctive 
mindset that takes its roots from its colonial past. A penchant for nationalism and 
sovereignty are key attributes of the mindset. A broad understanding of the historical 
imperatives will help understand the evolution of psychologies of the countries in the 
region over time, driven by geo-strategic circumstances. I draw on the findings to gain a 
clearer perspective on the failure of regionalism in South Asia. More precisely, I focus on 
how the asymmetrical power structure is manifested in the region and how the power 
balance has affected the inter-state relationships among South Asian countries. From a 
historical perspective, I also delve into the geo-strategic circumstances that led to the 
genesis of the SAARC and how the nascent organization evolved into the asymmetric 
environment. I utilize the findings to examine the prospect of regionalism in South Asia 
and draw relevant policy recommendations in this regard.  
While drawing recommendations, I also use a comparative analysis of regional 
experiences of the European Union and, closer to home, the ASEAN. In comparison with 
these two regional entities, I illustrate that their relative successes can be attributed to a 
different geo-strategic circumstances in which they were not constrained by a need to 
balance an inherent asymmetrical power balance. The comparative study is also useful in 
drawing relevant lessons, structures, or models that South Asia can emulate.   
I mostly base my research on the sources outlined in the literature review section 
of this proposal. Additionally, in order to keep my research current, I also include recent 
periodicals, journals, and other publications that deal with relevant issues.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is divided into five parts. The opening chapter sets in context the scope 
of the study by presenting the contextual background, the research questions, the 
literature review, and the hypotheses. The second chapter delves into the nature of 
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asymmetrical power balance in South Asia, its evolution, and its implications on the 
regional dynamics. The chapter shows that the prevalence of an Indo-centric power 
balance is the primary source of discord in the region, which has resulted in conflicting 
relationships among South Asian countries. The findings of the chapter provide the 
context for the third chapter, which analyzes how the asymmetrical power structure 
affected the evolution process of the SAARC. The chapter demonstrates that the self-
imposed provisions of unanimity in decision-making and exclusion of bilateral 
contentious issues has limited the SAARC’s role as a regional organization. The fourth 
chapter constitutes a comparative analysis of regional integration process of the EU and 
ASEAN. Besides drawing some relevant lessons from the two relatively successful 
models of regional integration, the chapter also notes that the two regional entities could 
succeed compared to SAARC because they are not constrained by an asymmetrical 
power structure as one finds in South Asia. Finally, in the fifth and the final chapter, the 
thesis draws conclusions from the findings and attempts to present policy 
recommendations for SAARC members to boost regional cooperation in South Asia.  
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II. ASYMMETRICAL POWER BALANCE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTER-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN SOUTH 
ASIA 
In South Asia, geopolitical imperatives hold precedence in regional affairs over 
economic or social imperatives.67 In this context, this chapter discusses the emergence of 
India as a dominant power in South Asia and its implications on regionalism. The chapter 
begins with a brief overview of South Asia as a region. It then discusses the evolution of 
power asymmetry in post-colonial South Asia, owing to a huge disparity in size and 
resources between India and other South Asian countries. The chapter argues that in such 
a geopolitical setting, India aspired for a predominant role in the region, considering itself 
the rightful heir to the British Raj. The chapter then discusses the implications of the 
power asymmetry on inter-state relationships between India and its neighbors. The 
chapter shows that contradiction between India’s aspiration for regional leadership and 
the reluctance of the smaller powers to accept Indian hegemony has resulted in 
conflicting relationships between India and all its neighbors. The chapter then draws 
implications on the prospects of regionalism. It argues that the extant bilateral disputes 
between India and its neighbors have adversely affected the drive towards regionalism. 
The chapter also notes that the blame cannot be put entirely on India alone as Pakistan’s 
non-cooperation in this regard has also proved to be an important setback.  
A. SOUTH ASIA: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The concept of South Asia as a region is relatively recent. The region found its 
first formal expression as an entity when seven South Asian countries came together in 
1985 to establish the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 
aiming to address issues of peace and development. The SAARC was the first 
institutionalized effort to promote regionalism in South Asia. The initial seven members 
of the SAARC were Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka; Afghanistan joined as the eighth member in 2007.   
67 Prasad, “Prospects for Greater Cooperation in South Asia,” 64. 
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South Asia as a region displays two important characteristics.68 First, it is largely 
Indo-centric in character, because India is central to it both geographically and in terms 
of socio-cultural continuities and infrastructure. India shares common land and maritime 
borders with every SAARC member except Afghanistan. These other countries, 
individually and separately, have more in common with India than with each other. The 
second characteristic of the region is an asymmetric power structure that manifests in 
huge disparities in terms of size and resources between India vis-à-vis other SAARC 
countries. According to S.D. Muni, “India enjoys a dominant status in the region, not 
only due to its sheer size and population, but also in terms of natural resources, 
technological know-how, and economic and military strength, thus making it far superior 
to any one of its neighbors, or even to all of them put together.”69  
B. EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL POWER ASYMMETRY  
After the departure of the British from the Indian sub-continent in 1947, India 
inevitably emerged as the dominant power in the region by virtue of its size, location, and 
economic and military strength. With considerable disparity in economic and military 
resources between India and the other countries in the region, an asymmetrical power 
balance was thus inadvertently created. With the newfound glory, it was hardly surprising 
that the Indian ruling elite inherited the perception that India should rightfully assume 
leadership in the region. 
In fact, India’s aspiration for a predominant role in the region can be traced back 
to historical and psychological factors. A. K. M. Sabur notes, “Since the ancient time, 
India, particularly its Hindi heartland, has been the center of power in South Asia, which 
dominated the peripheries. For about more than a millennium, Delhi was the center of 
power except for the initial period of the British rule when Kolkata (also in India) was the 
capital.”70 Sabur points out that Indians still remember the heyday of the Indian empire 
68 S. D. Muni, “South Asia,” in Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, ed. Mohammed Ayoob 
(London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1980), 39. 
69 Ibid. 
70 A. K. M. Sabur, “The Challenge of CBMs in South Asia: A Bangladeshi Perspective,” in The 
Challenge of Confidence-Building in South Asia, ed. Moonis Ahmar (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 
2001), 139. 
 20 
                                                 
with a great deal of nostalgia, and the sentiment is shared even by Indians with a 
considerably moderate view towards Indian leadership role in the region.71  
The nostalgic fervor for Indian greatness gained prominence in the post-colonial 
period. In the aftermath of the colonial period, India regarded itself as the “successor 
state” to the British Raj and perceived themselves as the rightful heir to rights and 
privileges the British used to enjoy.72 India inherited the British geo-strategic thinking, 
which embraced the whole of the Indian sub-continent into its security umbrella, 
extending up to Tibet and Afghanistan, and included command of the Indian Ocean.73 
With the strategic mindset, India largely perceived itself as the incumbent custodian of 
the security of the Indian sub-continent and with a destiny to play a major role in regional 
and world affairs commensurate with its geographical placement, historical experience, 
and power potential.74 
Many observers believe that this strategic thinking has remained the cornerstone 
of Indian security perceptions for most parts of the post-colonial period. Sabur points out 
that the perception was reflected in the India Doctrine that was promulgated during the 
prime-minister ship of Indira Gandhi in the 1980s.75 He further argues that the doctrine 
can be regarded as a South Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine,76 “wherein India 
views the entire region as single strategic unit and herself as its sole custodian of security 
and stability.”77 According to C. K. Lal, “[The] doctrine claimed India’s pre-eminent 
right to intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring countries if disorder threatened to 
71 Sabur, “The Challenge of CBMs in South Asia, 139. 
72 Ibid., 140. 
73 S. U. Kodiara, “Regional Roles and Behavior in South Asia: A Theoretical Framework of Regional 
Cooperation,” in Regional Co-operation and Development in South Asia, 34. 
74 S. D. Muni, “South Asia,” in Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, ed. Mohammed Ayoob 
(London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980), 47. 
75 Sabur, “The Challenge of CBMs in South Asia,” 140. 
76 The Monroe Doctrine, named after President James Monroe, who espoused the policy in 1850, was 
a U.S. foreign policy that sought to establish U.S. hegemony in the American hemisphere by preventing 
efforts by European nations to colonize land or interfere with states in North or South America. It stated 
that any such acts by European powers would be viewed as acts of aggression, requiring U.S. intervention.  
77 Sabur, “The Challenge of CBMs in South Asia,” 140. 
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extend beyond national boundaries.”78 Feroz Khan adds, “This school of thought asks 
that India maintain a dominant posture and assertive policy towards its neighbors.”79  
Consequently, Indian strategic thinking in South Asia was conditioned by the 
following three assumptions that reflected their hegemonic aspiration:80 Firstly, India’s 
desired objective is to maintain the territorial status quo in the region based on the 
principle of peaceful coexistence. India should be perceived as a benevolent giant with a 
role similar to that of the United States in the American hemisphere. Secondly, the 
smaller powers of South Asia should accept the Indian perspective and the subsidiary 
roles implicitly assigned to them by the aspiring hegemon. Non-acceptance of this 
assigned secondary role would be perceived “obstacles” to be overcome by diplomacy or 
even military pressure. Finally, India must seek to limit or offset the potential political 
and military interventionist policies of the external powers in the South Asian region 
through international diplomacy and, if necessary, by purchasing arms from one or more 
of the great powers.81 
With the strategic mindset, many observers believe that India has resorted to 
measures that can be compared to coercive diplomacy or strategic coercion in dealing 
with its neighbors. Strategic coercion refers to the “deliberate and purposive” use of 
threats to “influence another’s strategic choices” in inter-state relations.82 Indian actions, 
such as the gradual integration of the erstwhile princely states; the forcible absorption of 
Hyderabad, Kashmir, and Goa; the annexation of Sikkim; the imposed protectorate over 
Bhutan; a dominant presence in Nepal and Bangladesh; and finally the humbling of 
Pakistan can be regarded as coercive measures.83 In the case of Sikkim, a treaty 
78 C. K. Lal, “From Nehru Creed to Indira Doctrine,” Himal South Asian, February 2009, 
http://old.himalmag.com/himal-feed/60/442-from-nehru-creed-to-indira-doctrine.html.  
79 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism in South Asia,” in Does South Asia Exist, 228. 
80 Shrikant Paranjpe and Raju G. C. Thomas, “India and South Asia: Resolving the Problems of 
Regional Dominance and Diversity,” in Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response, 
ed. David J. Myers (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1991), 168. 
81 Paranjpe and Thomas, “India and South Asia,” 168. 
82 Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. 
Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 15. 
83 Lawrence Ziring, ed., The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbors and the Great 
Powers (New York: Praeger, 1978), 198. 
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concluded in 1950 turned the small erstwhile independent state in the eastern Himalayas 
into an Indian “protectorate.” Interestingly, twenty-five years after signing the treaty, 
India annexed it through a two-stage process of destabilization and military occupation.84 
In the case of Bhutan, a similar treaty obliged the small Himalayan state to be “guided” 
by India on foreign affairs and defense.85 
Interestingly, India has also at times adopted the strategy of developing 
conciliatory relationship with its neighbors. Khan points out that “in the post–Cold War 
era, India has been both conciliatory and aggressive.”86 When the policy makers in New 
Delhi realized that the aggressive regional posture adopted by India in the 1980s was 
largely counterproductive, they felt the need to replace their doctrine with a more 
moderate one. The enunciation of Gujral Doctrine by the then-Indian prime minister I. K. 
Gujral in 1997 marked a significant departure of the dominant and assertive policy of the 
erstwhile India Doctrine towards a more conciliatory Indian posture in the region. Based 
on non-reciprocity, the new doctrine aimed at generating mutual trust and confidence in 
the region.87 Khan notes, “The doctrine prompted India’s most conciliatory stance and 
notably improved relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.”88 Despite these 
positive developments, it can be argued that mistrust among SAARC members remains 
extant because of the perceived inconsistency in India’s foreign policies. As Sabur points 
out, “Recent changes in the Indian attitude towards the neighbors still remain short of 
assuaging the suspicion of smaller South Asian countries to their big neighbor.”89   
C. IMPLICATIONS ON INTERSTATE RELATIONS  
As a result of the asymmetrical power balance, one finds varying degrees of 
conflict and cooperation in interstate relationships among the constituent states of South 
Asia. Central to this fluctuating pattern of conflict and cooperation remains the role of 
84 Shah, “A Himalayan Red Herring,” 198. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism in South Asia,” 228. 
87 Sabur, “The Challenge of CBMs in South Asia,” 143. 
88 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism in South Asia,” 228. 
89 Sabur, “The Challenge of CBMs in South Asia,” 145. 
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India as a dominant power. It is interesting that the region has witnessed several crises, 
sometimes bordering on military conflicts between India and nearly all of its neighbors. 
Of course, the inter-state dynamics are dominated by the enduring nature of conflict 
between India and Pakistan. However, the hostility and suspicion that characterizes Indo-
Pakistan relations are reflected, albeit to a lesser degree, in India’s relations with all other 
South Asian countries. 
1. India-Pakistan Relations 
Among all the inter-state dynamics in South Asia, the most pervasive is the India-
Pakistan conflict. Rooted in seemingly intractable issues, many observers believe that the 
India-Pakistan conflict has become an epitome of enduring rivalry. Since their creation as 
independent states on 15 August 1947, in the wake of the partition of the Indian 
subcontinent, the two countries have fought four major wars and countless border 
skirmishes, some even bordering on nuclear showdowns. Few other conflicts in the post–
World War II era, with the possible exception of the Arab-Israeli dispute, have proved as 
intractable.90   
The narrative of the two-nation theory based on Muslim and Hindu nationalism 
that led to the partition of the Indian sub-continent proved to be an important instigator of 
the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. Pakistani nationalism was based on a 
Muslim communalist and separatist discourse of power that underlined the significance 
of Muslim identity in a predominantly Hindu India.91 On the other hand, the same form 
of nationalism did not take root in India. Instead of a primordial need for a distinctive 
identity, India was conceived as a secular state with a strong sense of national identity 
that was forged through the crucible of the struggle for independence.92 Thus, Pakistani 
nationalism tended to be exclusive in nature, whereas Indian nationalism professed to be 
inclusive. These contradictions would prove to be a strong base for an enduring rivalry 
90 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 1. 
91 Vali Nasr, “National Identities and the India-Pakistan Conflict,” in The India-Pakistan Conflict: An 
Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 179. 
92 Nasr, “National Identities and the India-Pakistan Conflict,” 192. 
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between the two countries. As Citha D. Maass points out, “The ideological antagonism 
turned into a conflictual bilateral factor because of its subsequent instrumentalisation by 
both countries in their domestic politics and foreign policies.”93 
The embodiment of conflicting ideologies by Pakistan and India in the course of 
partition eventually manifested itself in a mutually competitive and antagonistic attitude. 
The Kashmir issue stands out as a prominent manifestation of the diametrically opposed 
ideology between the two countries. As Khan explains, “Jammu and Kashmir remain at 
the heart of the bitter rivalry and strategic competition between India and Pakistan.”94 
Pakistan views Kashmiri identity as an extension of Pakistani identity, a component of 
the discourse that produced Pakistan, whereas India views it as an extension of its own 
over-encompassing secular identity. According to Khan, “Pakistan, which was formed on 
the basis of protecting the rights of south Asian Muslims, sees the absorption of Kashmir 
as a national duty.”95 Nasr succinctly puts the Pakistani view of Kashmir as “the 
unfinished last chapter of partition.”96 Conversely, India vehemently feels that giving up 
on Kashmir would prove its non-commitment to the country’s fundamental ideology of 
inclusiveness and secularism.  
These diametrically opposed schools of thought that dominate India-Pakistan 
relations have made confidence-building measures in South Asia a problematic affair. As 
result of the seemingly irreconcilable nature of Indo-Pakistan disputes, the two countries 
have resorted to a diverse range of measures in order to offset strategic and operational 
advantages vis-à-vis each other. Khan points out that “the two states have focused on 
both internal balancing (modernizing their armed forces and going nuclear) and external 
93 Citha D. Maass, “South Asia: Drawn between Cooperation and Conflict,” in The Dynamics of South 
Asia: Regional Cooperation and SAARC, ed. Eric Gonsalves and Nancy Jetly (New Delhi: Sage 
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balancing (that is, forging alliances or “‘treaties of friendship’ with great powers.”)97 The 
measures thus adopted have pulled the region into the vortex of security dilemma.98  
An alarming consequence of the security dilemma in South Asia has been the 
overt introduction of nuclear dimension in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. India overtly 
performed its first nuclear weapon test in May 1998, which was promptly followed by a 
Pakistani test just two weeks later. With the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by the two 
arch-rivals in the region, South Asia has inadvertently become a potential nuclear 
flashpoint.  
The two adversaries’ acquisition of nuclear capabilities has arguably further 
aggravated the security dilemma. India has tried to come up with newer strategies, such 
as the “Cold Start” doctrine, which is designed to allow rapid but shallower attacks in 
multiple fronts by the Indian military just enough to punish any Pakistani ventures into 
Indian soil but stopping short before crossing the Pakistani nuclear threshold.99 To this 
new Indian strategy, Pakistan’s answer has been to introduce tactical nuclear weapons 
into the battlefield.  
The implication of power asymmetry between India and Pakistan becomes more 
serious with Pakistan’s reliance on non-state and proxy actors to offset its strategic 
disadvantage vis-à-vis India’s huge conventional military capabilities. Pakistan’s use of 
militancy to promote its national interests is in essence an important part of Pakistan’s 
grand strategy resulting from “the state’s acute material and political weakness.”100 
Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur explain that “once adopted, the militant strategy became a 
central component of Pakistani security policy, its sophistication and importance 
increasing with each subsequent conflict.”101 Khan also points out that “the Kashmiri 
97 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism in South Asia,” 229. 
98 The security dilemma happens when a country’s quest for security measures to offset the security 
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insurgency relied primarily on Pakistan, which since 1994, had also been supporting the 
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and enabling demobilized warriors from Afghanistan 
to join the Kashmiri insurgents. The strategy of fueling a low-intensity war has tied down 
several hundred thousand Indian forces in Kashmir in a protracted counterinsurgency.”102 
Meanwhile, the situation gets complicated as India also allegedly gets embroiled in 
supporting proxy actors against Pakistan. As Khan points out, “For the past several years, 
Pakistan is alleging India’s complicity from Afghanistan in a rising insurgency in 
Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province.”103  
It is difficult to foresee improved Indo-Pakistan relations as long as the latter 
continues its strategy to use proxy actors to further its cause. The situation becomes more 
alarming when it appears that the strategy to use non-state and proxy actors has 
seemingly backfired. Ganguly and Kapur explain that, “notwithstanding impressive 
domestic and international successes, recently, Pakistan has begun to suffer from a 
“jihadi paradox”; the very conditions that made Pakistan’s militant policy useful in the 
past now make it extremely dangerous.”104 The main reasons behind the backfiring of the 
strategy can be attributed to the dwindling control of Pakistan over the various militant 
groups that it supports and the ever broadening scope of the militant groups. As Ganguly 
and Kapur point out, “Militant organizations have refused to subordinate their interests to 
Pakistan’s broader strategic imperatives. [They] have also adopted far more ambitious 
goals than those of the Pakistani government.”105 The duo maintains that, in order to 
avoid a catastrophe, Pakistan must realize that the militant strategy has become a liability 
and unequivocally end its support for militancy. Of course, India has to support this 
Pakistani move by facilitating efforts to reduce its military pressures on Pakistan.106 
Considering the track records of both countries, it appears that the possibility of a 
solution along these lines remains distant.  
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2. India-Bangladesh Relations 
India’s role in the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 from erstwhile West Pakistan 
meant that the two countries started on a strong footing in its bilateral relations. The ties 
between the two countries remained strong during the presidency of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the founder of the nascent state. However, after the assassination of President 
Rahman in 1975, subsequent Bangladeshi leaderships gradually sought to decrease what 
they presumed to be an overwhelming Indian influence into its affairs by diversifying its 
contacts with other major powers like the United States, China, and Pakistan. It is ironic 
that, although Bangladesh recognized the geopolitical centrality of India in the region and 
India’s contribution in the country’s liberation struggle, the same conditions have made 
Bangladesh nurture a growing suspicion and fear of Indian domination and control in the 
future.107 As a consequence, Bangladesh sought to reinforce its separate identity and 
newly acquired nationhood by resisting Indian overtures.108 
Furthermore, many contentious issues continue to impair the relations between 
India and Bangladesh, which the Bangladeshis invariably attribute to Indian 
intransigence. Indian reluctance to ratify the 1974 Indira-Mujib Land Boundary 
Agreement between the two countries, which Bangladesh has ratified, remains a primary 
bone of contention. Similarly, Bangladesh views India’s plan to establish a transit route 
to the seven isolated Northeastern states of India that lie adjacent to Indo-Bangladesh 
boundary with apprehension. Bangladesh believes that the Indian plan is detrimental to 
its security interests. For its part, India alleges that Bangladesh is allowing the latter’s 
territory to be used as training camps for Indian insurgents from the Northeast. Taking 
the Indian allegation a step further, Feroz Khan notes that “India has accused Bangladesh 
of conniving with Pakistan to destabilize India’s northeast.”109 On its part,  
Bangladesh views this Indian allegation only as a pretext to target its country.110 In 
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response to New Delhi’s pressures on those issues, Bangladesh has shown its defiance by 
refusing the transit of natural gas exports from the region.111 Furthermore, the issue of 
Bangladeshi migrants to India remains a major irritant in the two countries bilateral 
relations. As Khan explains, “Growing illegal immigration and cross-border movements 
into India have also raised tensions between the two SAARC neighbors.”112  
3. India-Nepal Relations 
Despite the historical and cultural ties that India enjoys with Nepal due to the 
latter’s pre-dominantly Hindu populations, Indo-Nepal relations are also plagued by 
mistrust of Indian motives. Nepal’s perception of India as a dominant neighbor changes 
with the system of government in the country. However, it appears that there is a general 
consensus among all the political forces in Nepal that the country needs to be wary of 
Indian motives so as not to succumb to the latter’s interests. A primary bone of 
contention is the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty, which New Delhi sees as the 
framework of its relations with Nepal, but which Kathmandu considers as already having 
outlived its utility.113 Nepal feels the treaty provides India considerable leverage in 
influencing in its security and economic matters. Nepal’s apprehension was solidified 
when India used the treaty as basis for imposing an economic blockade in 1989 in the 
pretext that Nepal violated the norms of the treaty by acquiring arms from China. Nepal’s 
anxiety over India’s intentions is further raised when successive Indian governments have 
downplayed Nepal’s repeated plea to re-examine the treaty. All the talks in this regard so 
far have stalled only after a few rounds of negotiations.  
Furthermore, the intermittent use of the “China Card,” or seeking help from China 
over India, remains a major irritant for India. Christian Wagner points out, “There were 
also tensions in the close [Indo-Nepal] bilateral relationship, which forced [erstwhile] 
111 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism in South Asia,” 231. 
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Nepalese kings and governments to attempt to establish closer relations with China in 
order to circumvent India’s influence.”114 
4. India-Sri Lanka Relations 
Indian adventurisms that led to military intervention in Sri Lanka has helped 
foster a heightened threat perception in the country vis-à-vis Indian motives. These 
perceptions have been reflected by many Sri Lankan leaders. Leaders like John 
Kotelawala were most vocal in this regard and expressed fear that Nehru’s ambition was 
dominating smaller countries in the region. The prime minster duo, SWRD Bandaranike 
and his wife Sirimavo Bandaranaike repudiated Sir Lanka’s fear of Indian aggression but 
remained vigilant of the Indian factor in the island’s security.115 President J. R. 
Jayawardene took a more practical approach towards India, and despite the unauthorized 
airdrop of supplies to the Tamil insurgents in 1987, he welcomed the Indian offer to 
provide Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to the country in fighting the growing Tamil 
secessionist insurgency that threatened to engulf the island country.116 His successor, 
Ranasinghe Premadassa, was less inclined to believe in Indian benevolence and 
deliberately stayed away from the country during the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka peace 
accord in 1987 and later asked the IPKF to leave Sri Lanka during his presidency.117  
5. India-Afghanistan Relationship 
The accession of Afghanistan into the SAARC forum has further raised security 
concerns and debates in the region. With Afghanistan, India traditionally has had good 
relations. However, this nexus may not have positive implications in the drive for 
regional cooperation because the good relations can be largely attributed to “their historic 
and common rivalry against Pakistan.”118 The dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
114 Wagner, Security Cooperation in South Asia: 11. 
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goes back to 1893 when the British created the 1600-mile Durand Line as a buffer 
between their imperial holdings and Czarist Russia. Now the border between the two 
countries, the Durand Line remains a major bone of contention in their bi-lateral relations 
as Afghanistan refuses to accept the demarcation.119 Furthermore, Kabul even refused to 
recognize the newly independent Pakistan. As Christian Wagner explains, “Afghanistan 
was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s accession to the United Nations [in 1947] 
and has still not recognized the Durand Line as an international border.”120 Moreover, 
Afghan claim to Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) remains a 
major irritant in their relations with Pakistan. 
The security situation gets worsened as both India and Pakistan compete for 
influence over Afghanistan. Pakistan’s intervention in Afghani affairs appears to be 
driven not only by the former’s interests in the latter’s country, but also to pursue its 
interests in Kashmir.121 As Kapur and Ganguly explain, “The Afghan conflict would thus 
serve as a ‘smokescreen’ behind which Pakistan could wage a renewed militant campaign 
in Kashmir. Indeed, Zia reportedly referred in private to the war in Afghanistan as ‘the 
Kashmir jihad.’122 In the same vein, Wagener points out, “Pakistan has used the conflict 
with India to legitimize its intervention in Afghanistan and its support for the Taliban in 
the 1990s. Therefore, the Afghan civil war in the 1990s was also a proxy war between 
India and Pakistan.”123  
For its part, India has strived to exert influence in Afghanistan both through 
military and economic assistance. Wagener notes, “After the international community 
intervened in 2001, India became the biggest non-Western donor in Afghanistan and has 
invested more than US$ 1 billion since then.”124 He further points out, “In October 2011 
India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement, which is the basis for the 
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military cooperation between the Indian Army and the Afghan Security Forces 
(ASF).”125  
Thus, Afghanistan’s accession in the SAARC equation appears to have further 
complicated the already fragile security dynamics in the region. As Khan explains, “India 
accuses Pakistan of using Afghan territory for training militants that wage jihad in 
Kashmir, denied by Pakistan; Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of continuing to support the 
Taliban, a charge also denied; and Pakistan, in turn, accuses India of conniving with 
Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan and stoke irredentist claims, a charge denied by both 
Afghanistan and India.”126 Thus, regional cooperation certainly becomes problematic in 
this mayhem of claims and counter claims. 
6. India-Bhutan Relationship 
With Bhutan, India enjoys a good relationship, which can be attributed largely to 
the small Himalayan Kingdom’s willingness to accept Indian preponderance in its affairs. 
According to Wagner, “The Friendship treaty of August 1949 gave India substantial 
influence in handling the foreign policy and international affairs of Bhutan.”127 For India, 
Bhutan remains an important, albeit small, ally in protecting its security interest vis-à-vis 
China in the Himalayan region.128  
As far as Bhutan is concerned, its willingness to show compliance to Indian 
interests has yielded positive results for the country’s economy. The small Himalayan 
kingdom has been a key recipient of Indian largess, which India has been keen to show as 
appreciation for its friendship with Bhutan. As Wagner explains, “India has supported 
Bhutan economically with substantial means. For many years, the kingdom has been the 
biggest recipient of India’s development cooperation. In 2012/13 more than 36 percent of 
funds from the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program went to Bhutan”129 
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Due to Indian support, Bhutan has managed to improve its economy substantially. Bhutan 
has become a major producer of hydro-electricity, of which India is a big and insatiable 
market.130 The constructions of hydro-electric projects were possible for the small 
country because of economic and technical support of India. As Wagner explains, “The 
Indian government has also been financing the construction of dams for hydro-electric 
power produced by Indian companies for many years. Bhutan is producing enough 
electricity for it to be exported to northern India.”131  
Despite the close bi-lateral relations and the economic gains made through Indian 
assistance, it appears that political and economic relations with India have not always 
been a smooth affair between the two countries. In the domestic politics of Bhutan, the 
nature of the relationship with India remains a constant matter of debate, especially with 
regards to Indian influence in its foreign policies. Bhutanese intermittent attempts to 
reassert its foreign policy have failed to generate a positive response from India. When 
the Bhutanese government under Prime Minister Jigme Thinley tried to realign Bhutan’s 
foreign policy through a rapprochement with China and other countries, New Delhi did 
not welcome the Bhutanese move. As retribution, the Indian government delayed 
supplies and did not prolong a treaty on subsidies for gas and energy to the Himalayan 
kingdom. As a result, the Bhutanese government had to forego its adventurism with 
foreign policy and resort back to the continuation of close cooperation with India, 
including on security issues.132   
D. IMPLICATIONS ON REGIONALISM 
Due to its enormous size and resources, India’s relationships with the smaller 
powers assume greater significance in the regional order than the relationships among the 
smaller countries themselves. Moreover, the geo-political constraints make it 
considerably difficult, if not impossible, for the smaller states to bypass India and 
proactively engage with each other. As a consequence, their relationships with each other 




                                                 
have largely been limited, prohibiting them from having greater impact on the 
regionalism process.    
Viewed from this context, it can be argued as long as India continues to have 
bilateral disputes with its neighbors; regional cooperation will remain a difficult 
undertaking. As a result of extant bilateral disputes, South Asian countries have so far 
failed to craft any optimal level of regional cooperation and enhance each other’s 
development and security in the process, which is the primary goal of regionalism.133  
Differing viewpoints among South Asian countries have also adversely affected 
the regionalism process. Among all the countries in the region, India has largely 
remained ambivalent towards the prospect of regionalism. As a growing country of 
global significance, India has felt its interests are better served by thinking global rather 
than regional.134 Some analysts even point out that improved linkages with the United 
States since the late 1990s has reinforced India’s conviction that it is now in the big 
leagues, and dealing with other South Asian countries would be something irrelevant and 
even “insulting.”135  
On the other hand, most other South Asian countries are more inclined to pursue 
regionalism, which they view as a platform to boost their otherwise nominal political and 
economic clout in the region. For Sri Lanka, a small island country, its vision for regional 
cooperation is primarily motivated by economic incentives, which it realizes it can gain 
through a collective approach of regionalism.136 Likewise, the two land-locked states, 
Nepal and Bhutan, both foresee huge economic scope through regional integration. The 
tiny Himalayan countries are optimistic that they can seek market for their abundant 
hydro-electric resources by engaging in regionalism.137 Similarly, Bangladeshis have 
also learned to shed their inhibitions and are proactively advocating the need for 
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constructing a broader regional community.138 As Rehman Sobhan points out, “Many of 
the present generation of Bangladeshis have recognized that 55,000 square miles of land 
area is too narrow a space to contain their aspirations.”139 
Indian ambivalence is not the only factor impeding regionalism in South Asia. 
Pakistan, the other regional power, has also remained averse to the idea of engaging 
proactively in regional cooperation. Pakistani mindset becomes evident from its 
reluctance to grant the status of most favored nation (MFN) to India, although the latter 
granted the status to Pakistan in 1996.140  
Pakistan’s unwillingness is largely based on two broad assumptions, which are 
primarily India-focused. First, it is driven by the premonition that Pakistan’s economy 
would be overwhelmed with overflow of Indian goods and capital if such regional trades 
are promoted. The second factor involves the Pakistani mindset that any normalization of 
relations with India would threaten Pakistan’s identity as a state.141 Some analysts argue 
that such assumptions are actually influenced by the special interests of Pakistan’s 
political and military establishments. Because such establishments have been primary 
beneficiaries of the state budget on the basis of the Indian threat, encouraging economic 
cooperation and confidence-building measures with India would not serve their special 
interests.142 As Akmal Hussain notes, “Influential members of Pakistan’s establishment 
saw a rapid improvement in economic relations and a permanent peace with India as a 
threat to the raison d’etre of the large military establishment.”143  
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E. CONCLUSION 
The advent of power asymmetry in South Asia with India as the dominant power 
generated a sense of mistrust and suspicion of Indian motives among the smaller 
countries. The contradictions resulting from Indian aspiration for regional hegemony and 
defiance by the other countries to the presumed Indian hegemony has manifested in 
varying degrees of conflicting relationships between India and her neighbors.  
India has not always been able to address its presumed role of hegemony 
adequately to its neighbors’ or its own satisfaction. As theories of hegemony suggest, a 
successful hegemonic power is one that engages in not only rule-making and rule-
enforcement, but is also able to acquire deference of secondary states of its leadership.144 
So far, it appears India has failed to achieve that goal. Due to its ambivalent foreign 
policies, India has only further alienated its neighbors. Hence, the onus lies on India to 
win the confidence of its neighbors and change its perception as a regional hegemon if it 
wants to pursue regionalism.  
To this end, the role of other countries will be equally important. Pakistan’s non-
cooperation in this regard, if continued, will remain a major impediment, as it is the 
second largest country in the region with a major potential to contribute towards 
regionalism. However, in consideration of the sensitive nature of the India-Pakistan 
conflict it will be easier said than done. Other countries will also have to undergo a 
positive change in their attitude towards India, if they genuinely want to reap the benefits 
of regional integration. Shedding the ingrained suspicion of Indian motives can be the 
first step towards that goal.   
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III. ASYMMETRICAL POWER BALANCE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE SAARC 
This chapter discusses the implications of the asymmetrical power balance on the 
role of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It highlights the 
SAARC’s ineffectiveness as a regional organization owing to the adverse effects of the 
power asymmetry in the region. Regional politics played a huge role in influencing the 
formation of the SAARC. Unlike other regional organizations that grew largely out of a 
necessity to counter outside threats, the SAARC was initially conceived as a strategy of 
smaller countries in the region to counter the growing military strength and influence of 
India, the regional power. In this strategic backdrop, India naturally became apprehensive 
over the prospect of the SAARC and was unwilling to join the organization. To convince 
India otherwise, the smaller countries were compelled to accept India’s preconditions for 
joining the SAARC. These compromises on the organization’s charter would later prove 
to be a limiting factor for the SAARC’s role in the region.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the genesis of the SAARC. It then 
discusses two provisions in its charter, which were incorporated on the insistence of India 
as preconditions for its accession. They were the provision of unanimity in decision-
making and the exclusion of bi-lateral contentious issues from the SAARC’s agenda. 
Next, the chapter discusses how divergent security perceptions between India and her 
neighbors have further impeded the SAARC’s role. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
importance of India’s role in revamping the SAARC and argues that the regional power’s 
role will ultimately be crucial in deciding the organization’s fate.  
A. GENESIS OF SAARC 
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an economic 
and political organization of eight countries in Southern Asia. In its founding in 1985, the 
SAARC was initially composed of seven countries: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, 
Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. Afghanistan joined as the eighth member at the 
Association’s 14th Summit in April 2007. For the region, coming out of the shadow of a 
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long colonial period and subsequent regional turmoil, the formation of the SAARC 
marked a watershed event for regional cooperation in the Indian subcontinent. As such, 
the SAARC’s establishment was viewed as a historic event, reflecting the first 
institutionalized effort by South Asian countries to overcome differences and forge 
multilateral cooperation. 
According to Ross Masood Hussain, the evolution of the SAARC can be broken 
down into three distinct phases.145 The initial phase constituted meetings at the Foreign 
Secretarial level from the initial seven member countries to agree on a basic framework 
of regional cooperation. The first meeting was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in April 
1981, and it was followed by a series of subsequent meetings that would continue up to 
March 1983.146 The second phase in the evolution of the SAARC constituted higher level 
meetings at the Foreign Ministerial levels, which first convened in New Delhi in August 
1983.147 This development elevated the process from the bureaucratic to the political 
level. In the course of the second phase, the participatory countries decided to launch an 
Integrated Program of Action (IPA) through the declaration of South Asian Regional 
Cooperation (SARC).148 By advancing to political levels, the meetings finally culminated 
in summits, which marked the third and final phase of the SAARC’s evolution. The first 
summit was held in Dhaka in December 1985, in which the Heads of State and 
Government of the erstwhile seven member countries decided to establish the 
SAARC.149 The Summit also ratified the SAARC Charter. 
Idealistically, the SAARC would appear to be a regional organization established 
to foster and accelerate development processes in economic and social sectors through 
collective action in specified areas of cooperation. The Preamble of the SAARC Charter 
begins with the words, “Desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity, and progress in the 
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region” and goes on “to enjoin the regional partners to uphold the classical values of a 
security order—sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use 
of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.”150 Hussain, in his 
admiration of the regional process asserts optimistically, “SAARC is a manifestation of 
the determination of the peoples of South Asia to cooperate regionally, to work together 
towards finding solutions to their common problems in a spirt of friendship, trust and 
understanding, and to create an order based on mutual respect, equity and shared 
benefits.”151 Moreover, cooperation within the SAARC framework would complement 
and be consistent with any obligations under existing bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements.152 Viewed from this angle, the SAARC thus reflected a genuine attempt to 
craft regional cooperation by South Asian countries and thereby reduce and eliminate 
conflicts among themselves. 
However, a closer look at the strategic circumstances during the SAARC’s 
formation reveals that the organization did not embody the desire of South Asian 
countries to be mutually cooperative but was rather a design to offset the power 
asymmetry in the region. For example, Bangladesh, an incipient nation formed after its 
secession from West Pakistan floated the idea of a regional forum in South Asia. As early 
as 1978–1979, President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh approached his counterparts over 
the prospects of a regional process. At his initiative, a Bangladesh Working Paper (BWP) 
on regional cooperation was drafted and forwarded to the governments of South Asian 
countries for consideration on November 25, 1980.153 The BWP indicated a great need 
for a formal institutional framework for implementing regional cooperation. It identified 
eleven areas of cooperation that were mostly non-controversial or non-political in 
nature.154 The Bangladeshi proposal was formally announced in the first meeting of the 
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Foreign Secretaries held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and was subsequently approved by the 
Foreign Ministers of the seven South Asian countries.  
Although the Bangladeshi initiative appeared to be driven by benign intents, there 
were underlying motives as well. President Rahman of Bangladesh, who initiated the 
regional process, came to power through a military coup in 1975, in which he overthrew 
the former civilian rule of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This development marked a 
significant change in the country’s policy towards India. Before that time, India had 
enjoyed a close relationship with the former Awami League government led by Mujibur. 
Bangladesh also remained largely subservient to India, as the latter had played a catalytic 
role in Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971.155 However, with the new president in power, 
Bangladesh was not very keen on maintaining its deferential position to India. As Anasua 
Chaudhury notes, “General Ziaur Rahman, the new leader was not interested to keep 
Bangladesh subservient to India, rather he was more intended to revive the country’s 
image, as one capable of looking after its own interests and could also make a positive 
contribution to the international affairs.”156  
Thus, Bangladeshi initiative to set up a regional organization can be considered 
the effort of a small state to offset its strategic disadvantage with a powerful neighbor. In 
an asymmetric environment, it becomes inherently difficult for a small state to deal with 
its bigger neighbor on an equal footing, thus reducing the former’s bargaining power in 
inter-state relationships. Because it is possible to offset such a disadvantage by going 
through a multilateral forum, Bangladesh as a small state opted for this route to deal with 
India.157 One South Asian observer Sukhdev Shah puts it bluntly: “The challenge for 
smaller countries was to devise a sensible arrangement for ‘taming the beast.’”158 He 
adds, “Creating a political safe-haven [for smaller countries] justified SAARC, with other 
subsidiary goals added almost as afterthought.”159  
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Given the power asymmetry, it was thus natural that the Bangladeshi sentiment 
was shared by other smaller South Asian countries too as they readily accepted 
Bangladesh’s initiative. Chaudhury notes, “The reactions of Nepal and Bhutan indicate 
how enthusiastic they were about the proposed cooperation.”160 Both countries obviously 
did not relish the Indian domination in their political and economic system.161 In the First 
Summit of the SAARC at Dhaka, the king of Bhutan diplomatically explained his 
willingness to join the SAARC thus: “We must transcend the narrow nationalism that 
prevails in our region due largely to historical reasons and create good neighborly 
relationships in which the magnanimity of the larger states would be matched by 
friendship of the smaller states.”162 It can be argued that the king’s remarks actually 
reflected the insecurity that the smaller states harbored about their larger neighbor and the 
need to counterbalance the perceived threat.  
It is important to consider the strategic backdrop during the SAARC’s formation 
as a major factor behind the rallying of small countries to form a regional organization. 
Chaudhury explains the strategic viewpoint in this way: “The dismemberment of Pakistan 
in 1971 and India’s role thereof, India’s ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ (PNE) in 1974, 
and annexation of Sikkim in the Indian Union in 1975—all these consecutive events 
altered the strategic environment in South Asia. In this changed situation, the smaller 
states felt encircled by India.”163  Thus, in such an environment, the smaller states 
naturally feared Indian domination in their political and economic system. The plausible 
answer to offset India’s growing power and influence in the region was for the smaller 
countries to come together and set up a multilateral forum.  
India quite naturally viewed this regional development in its backyard with 
suspicion. Hence, it was hardly surprising when India came up with only a lukewarm 
response to the concept of regional alliance. Chaudhury points out, “While the smaller 
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states in South Asia appeared to be enthusiastic to form a regional organization, there was 
‘less-than-enthusiastic response’ from India, the largest country of the region.”164  
Initially, the reaction of New Delhi to the prospect of a regional alliance was one of utter 
indifference, later followed by hesitation about the proposal.165  
Indian apprehension towards the prospect of the SAARC can be attributed to three 
factors.166 First, New Delhi’s suspicion of Western influence in the proposal of a regional 
organization caused India to raise its eyebrow. Because Bangladesh recommended the 
proposal, India suspected that it was at the behest of Western powers. Indian suspicion 
derived from the fact that Dhaka fell under Western influence after the military takeover 
in 1975.167 The second contributor, which was more strategic in nature, involved the 
Soviet dilemma. As India and the former Soviet Union were signatories to a Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship signed in August 1971, India feared that if the proposed regional 
organization had any anti-Soviet or pro-U.S. bias, it could pose as a severe setback to 
India’s relations with the Soviet Union.168 The third contributor, which would prove to be 
crucial in determining the fate of the SAARC, was the Indian viewpoint that the proposed 
regional organization could be used by other smaller countries to defy its regional 
dominance. So far, India had enjoyed a dominant status in its relationships with all its 
neighbors as they were conducted on a bilateral basis. For India, a multilateral regional 
order could be used to undermine her vital national interests.169 The Indian Prime 
Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi expressed this view in her inaugural address at the Meeting 
of the South Asian Foreign Ministers on August 1, 1983.170   
Notably, India, despite its suspicion and apprehension, chose not to reject the 
proposal for the regional organization. Two factors contributed to India’s eventual 
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acceptance of the proposal.171 First, the concept of a regional organization in its 
immediate neighborhood was too strong a concept for even India to ignore or reject.172 
Despite its aversion, India may have reasoned that it had enough clout in regional politics 
to influence and shape the nascent organization in congruence with India’s national 
interests. Second, India was concerned that if it directly rejected the idea, it could be 
isolated in the region, and such isolation could undermine its position in the region.173  
Thus, India’s eventual participation in the SAARC was filled with trepidation and 
carried out in a tardy and grudging manner. India emphasized two preconditions for its 
proposed accession to the organization. It demanded that the proposed organization not 
discuss bilateral and contentious issues and all decisions made by the organization be 
unanimous.174 At India’s behest, other member states agreed to both of these 
preconditions. It can be argued that India insisted on an apolitical SAARC because of its 
fear that the organization could be used as a forum for political debates, in which the 
smaller states would be able to exert pressure on the regional hegemon. 
To add to the predicament of the nascent organization, the other large state in 
South Asia, Pakistan, shared a similar hesitant attitude. In Pakistan’s case, its reticence 
can be attributed to the deeply rooted suspicion towards Indian motives. It is interesting 
that both archrivals in the region saw the attempt to establish a regional organization as 
each other’s handiwork and, hence, detrimental to their own national interests.175 As 
Chaudhury points out, “Pakistan suspected that the proposed organization would only 
strengthen India’s position in the region by giving India a more proactive forum to better 
voice and force her strategic interests upon her smaller neighbors.”176 In the aftermath of 
two major military losses with India in 1965 and 1971, Pakistan was nursing its wounds 
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from the humiliating experiences. In such a scenario, it is understandable; Pakistan did 
not have any heart to lower its position further in South Asia.177 
Pakistan’s ambivalence towards the SAARC, rooted in its apprehension towards 
India, has been consistent and well-known.178 S. D. Muni explains the Pakistani dilemma 
thus: “While [Pakistan] cannot get away with the fact of seeking development 
cooperation in South Asia, a real integration with the region which has India as the 
dominant member, threatens to blur its political and strategic identity.”179 On the home 
front, Pakistan’s leadership also faced considerable pressure from the country’s Islamic 
fundamentalist groups not to cooperate in this regard. Pakistan’s reluctance to grant Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) status to India to resume free trade reportedly resulted from 
pressure by the Islamic Fundamentalists lobby in the country’s government, “which 
considered such a step as an affront to Pakistan’s ideology and the very basis of 
existence.”180 With Islam playing a major role in the decision-making process of 
Pakistan, Pakistan was more inclined to pursue greater cooperation with West Asian or 
the Middle Eastern countries instead of the SAARC.181 Furthermore, the growing 
importance of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in world politics 
since 1973 also gave added incentive to look west. Pakistani leaders saw greater benefits 
in maintaining close links in the Persian Gulf region rather than in its immediate regional 
neighborhood.182  
Despite its apprehension, Pakistan also finally joined the SAARC, mainly for the 
same reason as India—the fear of being isolated in the region. As Ainslie T. Embree 
notes, “Pakistan feared India’s economic and political domination through any regional 
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accord, but they grudgingly supported Bangladesh’s idea in the end, fearing isolation.”183 
Thus, Pakistan’s eventual acceptance of the SAARC was also done in a reluctant and 
apprehensive manner, similar to India. 
As can be discerned, such hesitancy from the two largest states in the region 
would naturally have negative implications for the evolution and functioning of the 
SAARC. Chaudhury asserts, “Against this backdrop, the SAARC started its journey on a 
bumpy road.”184 
B. PROVISIONS IN THE SAARC’S CHARTER AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Excluding bilateral and contentious issues from its agenda and requiring 
unanimous decision-making have limited the SAARC’s ability to evolve properly and 
produce tangible results. The expectation that the early focus on economic and other 
forms of non-military cooperation would lead towards regional stability, development, 
and peace could not be met because political issues continued to overshadow economic 
issues. Although the SAARC was explicitly mandated to discuss only economic and 
development issues, security-related matters would inevitably come up and influence the 
discussion in its summit meetings.185 But restrained by its charter, the SAARC, as a 
regional body, would have no choice but to ignore these issues, however important they 
may be. The fallacy of this provision is underscored by S. D. Muni in this way: 
“Politically, SAARC has avoided taking into its purview bilateral and contentious issues 
affecting regional relations. And yet these issues, along with the spillover of internal 
conflicts on bilateral relations, have continuously inhibited faster and more substantial 
progress in SAARC.186  
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The situation gets aggravated with the provision that requires unanimity in the 
SAARC’s decision-making. Given the level of mistrust and the continuation of bilateral 
disputes, it is evidently difficult for SAARC countries to come to a common agreement in 
many important issues.  
Thus, over the years, its self-imposed restraint toward bilateral and contentious 
issues and the requirement for unanimous decision-making have inadvertently created 
obstacles for the SAARC’s growth and rendered it practically ineffective.  
It can even be argued that the exclusion of bilateral and contentious issues has 
manifested in a missed opportunity for regional peace and stability. As inter-state 
disputes remain extant and the SAARC continues to ignore these issues, its ability to 
foster regional cooperation becomes debatable. Ross Masson Hussain notes, “SAARC is 
being hard put to avoiding consideration of vital regional political and strategic questions 
as the organization possesses greater potential for defusing tensions and generating 
political goodwill in South Asia.”187 Hussain further adds, “Not being a formal security-
oriented alliance or bloc, and with ‘bilateral and contentious issues’ specifically excluded 
from its deliberations, the SAARC has neither solved, nor was it intended to solve, any 
other the contentious problems that plague and divide the nations of South Asia.”188  
Thus, avoidance of bilateral and contentious issues has really become critical and 
raises questions about the SAARC’s relevance and existence as a regional organization. 
Citha D. Maass explains as follows: 
Of utmost concern, of course, was whether SAARC would be able to 
survive at all given the detrimental circumstances prevailing in the region. 
In this context, the crucial question was whether SAARC could be turned 
into an appropriate regional mechanism of conflict control. The decision 
by the constituent member governments to exclude contentious bilateral 
issues from the SAARC agenda was met with certain reservations. It was 
seen as a pragmatic answer to the complicated conflictual structure of the 
region and accepted as a precondition for letting SAARC function at all. 
On the other hand, it was criticized for having missed the chance of 
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institutionalizing a neutral body suitable for and capable of mediating in 
the numerous regional conflicts.189 
It can thus be discerned that for the SAARC to be effective, it is imperative to 
make amendments in the general provision of its charter. As long as there are ongoing 
bilateral disputes, the environment will not be conducive to regional cooperation, and the 
SAARC cannot afford to remain oblivious. Hence, South Asian countries will have to 
somehow find ways to proactively deal with these security issues multilaterally instead of 
turning a blind eye to them. Although such discussions may warrant unwanted tensions 
and unnecessary hurdles, it will nonetheless be beneficial for regional cooperation in the 
long run. To this end, Cheema makes a strong point, “For how long can [SAARC] opt for 
evasion and avoid facing the real issues? Continued avoidance of bilateral contentious 
issues/disputes reflects the weakness of commitment to enhance the strength of a 
multilateral regional approach.”190 Even if modifications of both provisions prove to be a 
difficult undertaking, SAARC countries should at least make efforts to modify provisions 
relating to discussion on bilateral and contentious issues.191 
C. DIVERGENT SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
The success of regional cooperation depends on trust among the countries in the 
region. The prospect of regional cooperation diminishes when any member state is 
dissatisfied with the regional order because it perceives threats to its national interests 
emanating from within the region. Regional cooperation ventures, thus, must conform to 
the interests of the participating states and must respect the sovereignty of the member 
states.192 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema asserts, “If any one of the members believes that the 
other is not only an expansionist power but is also determined to pursue its hegemonic 
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designs, the chances of making any cooperative venture a success are often reduced to the 
minimum.”193  
In the SAARC’s case, the deficit in trust has resulted in divergent security 
perceptions between India and her neighbors, which makes regional cooperation further 
problematic. The following insight by Cheema provides a good overview of the 
conflicting security perceptions between India and her neighbors: 
South Asia is one of the few regions of the world in which not only a 
single power constitutes the core of the region but also is so overwhelming 
and domineering that the others are continuously entertaining fears of 
adverse future happenings. While many smaller powers are fearful of 
India’s future designs and want to contain India, India wants to contain the 
extra-regional intrusions. For its own policy objectives, India has turned to 
powers like the erstwhile USSR, USA, UK, whenever the need arose, but 
it has always sought to minimize the role of extra-regional powers if they 
are in the area because of linkages with other regional countries. For 
smaller countries, SAARC appears not just an association that promotes 
mutual cooperative ventures in economic field but also a means that could 
provide an alternative route to security. While almost all smaller members 
of SAARC would like to retain some credible security option to seek help 
from outsider equalizers, the level of dependency in many ways continues 
to be linked with the behavior and policies of the core country, India.194 
Divergent security perceptions mainly arise from two factors: the lack of a 
common threat and a perception of threat from regional sources. Unlike the countries of 
the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
whose common threat perceptions encouraged earnest security cooperation, SAARC 
countries did not share a common threat perception. As Cheema explains, “Since there 
exists no common threat, the security policy of member states have been evolved in 
congruence with individual countries own threat perceptions.”195 Moreover, as most 
SAARC states perceive that security threats actually emanate from regional sources, 
India and other countries pursue their own security interests, inducing a divisive rather 
than cohesive regional order.   
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Against this backdrop, it would seem intuitive for the smaller states to ensure that 
the SAARC actually works and its role is expanded. A functioning SAARC would help 
maintain a strategic counterbalance against the potential hegemony of India. Yet apart 
from their crucial role in establishing the regional organization, the smaller powers in the 
region have largely been unable to maintain momentum in the SAARC. Their failure to 
revitalize the SAARC can be attributed to four factors. First, the categorical exclusion of 
bilateral contentious issues from the SAARC’s agenda has barred them from proposing 
any meaningful discussions on regional security matters. Second, the provision of 
unanimity has inadvertently rendered the SAARC powerless in imposing any decision 
that would displease India, or any other country for that matter. Third, the smaller 
countries are so overwhelmed in their own intrastate security affairs that they have 
minimal political incentives and resources to expend towards regional security.196 Faced 
with such a dire state, some countries have chosen to acquiesce with India rather than 
confront it through a regional forum.197 Lastly, lack of support from global powers in this 
regard has also adversely affected the morale of the smaller powers to pursue 
energetically on the path of regionalism.198    
Thus, it can be argued that the SAARC contains a built-in contradiction. In its 
conception, it was designed to enmesh India in a regional process, which would thereby 
limit its preponderance in regional affairs. India’s condition for participation, however, 
was that the SAARC not deal with any issues that could seriously interfere with the 
pursuit of its interests—which, of course, was exactly the point of the organization. In 
such a contradictory environment, it can be argued that the SAARC lost its bearing.   
D. INDIA’S ROLE IN REVAMPING THE SAARC 
Since the SAARC’s inception, India has been apprehensive and undecided 
towards the organization’s prospect. As pointed out earlier, such attitude on the part of 
India mainly arises from its mindset that the SAARC is a mechanism of the smaller 
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neighbors to defy its regional dominance and undermine its national interests. However, 
the ambivalence can also be attributed to a difference in India’s perception towards its 
global versus regional aspirations. As such, it appears that India has accorded greater 
importance to its global ambitions and consigned regional ventures as lesser priorities. 
Dossani, Sneider, and Sood point out, “India, with its global ambitions firmly insight, has 
decided that it needs the world more than it needs South Asia.”199 As India continues to 
make impressive economic growth compared to its South Asian counterparts, it sees 
greater development opportunities in trading and investing with the rest of the world, 
particularly the richer countries, rather than with its immediate neighbors. Many 
observers also point out that as it seeks to match China’s global influence, India feels that 
its national interests are better served through strategic alignments with countries like the 
United States.200  
On a positive note, India is gradually outgrowing its apprehension towards the 
SAARC’s motives and shedding its ambivalence by showing genuine interest in regional 
venture. Rajiv Kumar attributes the change in India’s attitude to four factors. First, he 
points out that India is becoming less apprehensive towards regionalism because it has 
come to see regional cooperation as less of a threat.201 The rise in India’s confidence 
towards regional cooperation stems mainly from two positive political developments in 
the region: a changing attitude of its smaller neighbors and growing acceptance of India’s 
prominence in the region by international actors. Rajiv Kumar explains, “India’s 
neighbors have come to realize that forming a coalition that excludes India would be 
neither feasible nor successful. Moreover, major powers from outside the region seem to 
have finally accepted India’s relatively dominant position in South Asia (especially 
following its robust economic growth since 1991) and have backed off from using their 
bilateral or regional relationships with India’s neighbors to try and ‘redress the 
asymmetry’ within the region.”202  
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Secondly, India is becoming increasingly benign because it has come to realize 
the importance of multilateral efforts to address intrastate security issues and fight 
poverty in its border states.203 The regions along India’s borders with other South Asian 
countries have been historically poor and backward, creating conditions for insurgent 
movements. Kumar notes, “Conditions in the seven provinces of the northeastern region 
[adjoining Bangladesh] are especially poor, with significant militant activity further 
threatening stability.”204 As unilateral efforts have failed to yield positive results, Indian 
policy makers have come to realize that these regions can be developed and stabilized 
only through multilateral cooperation with neighboring countries. Thirdly, India’s 
lessening apprehension towards regionalism can be attributed to its impressive economic 
rise since the early nineties. Through the economic surge, India has earned worldwide 
recognition as a key global player, which has boosted its confidence. This newfound 
confidence has been important in framing India’s positive perception towards regional 
cooperation. As Kumar points out, “The growing economic confidence has made India 
less defensive about its neighbors’ policies and more open towards them.”205  
The fourth factor, which is arguably the most important, behind India’s changing 
perception is the growing Chinese economic influence in South Asia. As China continues 
to build up strong economic presence in the region, it certainly becomes a matter of 
concern to New Delhi. Kumar points out, “As of 2009, all the South Asian economies 
except Bhutan and Nepal have larger bilateral trade volumes with China than with India, 
despite the fact that China does not have preferential Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 
any of these countries aside from Pakistan.”206 Thus, as China pursues strategic political-
cum-economic relationships in the region, New Delhi worries that other South Asian 
countries may seek greater economic cooperation with China unless India makes 
concerted efforts to enhance its bilateral and regional relations with its neighbors.207 
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Furthermore, security concerns are also raised for India as China makes strategic 
investments in infrastructure projects in the region, such as in the Gwadar port in 
Pakistan and Chittagong in Bangladesh as part of its “string of pearls”208 strategy of 
extending its influence and access to ports and airfields around the Bay of Bengal and 
Arabian Sea.209 
India’s change in its strategic thinking towards regionalism was recently 
displayed in the 18th SAARC Summit that was recently held in Kathmandu, Nepal, in 
November 2014. In the inaugural session of the Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi emphasized the urgent need for collective efforts and reconciliation in South Asia. 
In his address, he pointed out, “Big and small, we face the same challenges—a long 
climb to the summit of development. But I have great belief in our boundless potential, 
and confidence that comes from the many inspiring stories of innovation and initiative in 
each of our countries.”210 In the address, Prime Minister Modi also explicitly 
acknowledged India’s responsibility in boosting the role of the SAARC, stressed India’s 
commitment to meet the challenge, and also welcomed other members to equally 
contribute. He said, “I know India has to take a lead, and we will do our part. I hope, each 
of you will, too.”211 
Thus, in a rather counter-intuitive way, the same power asymmetry that induced 
smaller states to create the SAARC against a hegemonic India has now become a strong 
basis for regionalism in South Asia. Lately, as India continues to rise economically and 
militarily, the power asymmetry has, in fact, grown. But, in the process, India has become 
more confident and views regionalism as less of an impediment to its strategic interests. 
Moreover, India’s growth makes its cooperation even more valuable to other states.   
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It thus becomes evident that the nature of relationship between India and the other 
member countries remain crucial in boosting the SAARC’s role. To this end, how India 
and other SAARC members perceive each other’s intentions, attitudes, and policies will 
be important in how the organization evolves in the future. As a big power in the region, 
the onus will ultimately lie on India to erode the impression of its perceived hegemonic 
pursuits. If the smaller powers continue to feel that they might be subjected to a 
hegemonic system, the SAARC will invariably have a difficult time garnering 
cooperation in the region. In the same vein, it is important for the smaller countries to 
convince New Delhi that they will not use the SAARC forum to single out India. It will 
be a difficult balance to achieve on both sides, but one that is crucial.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The formation of the SAARC marked a watershed event in the regional dynamics 
of South Asia. This historic step heralded the first institutionalized effort to overcome 
petty indifferences and forge regional cooperation among countries of the region. Yet, 
almost three decades down the road, the SAARC does not have much to its credit as 
South Asia remains mired in political and economic stagnancy. An article in The 
Economist in 2002 highlighted the SAARC’s failure in saying whether the organization 
has any value at all and whether it should be put out of its misery.212 Cheema also notes, 
“Hailed as a much-awaited panacea for many ills confronting the region, its performance 
remained far below the augured dividends.”213  
The SAARC’s failure to live up to its role can be largely attributed to the 
adversarial relationship between India and other member states. The strategic 
circumstances of the SAARC’s genesis, in which the smaller countries of the region came 
together to counterbalance India’s perceived hegemony, meant that the SAARC could not 
set off with a good start. The preconditions laid out by an apprehensive India for its 
accession to the nascent organization would prove to be a major setback to the SAARC’s 
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role. As India continued to remain ambivalent due to its suspicion about the underlying 
motives behind the SAARC’s formation and its belief that its political and economic 
interests are better served through global alliances, the SAARC has not been able to 
evolve into a functional institution. Thus, being neglected by the most powerful country 
in the region has certainly taken its toll on the SAARC. Furthermore, divergent security 
perceptions of India and other member states also put further constraints on the SAARC’s 
role and effectiveness.  
On an optimistic note, despite the bumpy start and subsequent lackluster 
performance, the SAARC’s better days may still be ahead. This positive development can 
be attributed to India’s changed perception towards the SAARC in recent years. A 
growing realization and acceptance among India’s neighbors about the significance of 
India’s role in regional cooperation have also helped to improve the regional dynamics. 
Such changes in attitudes have sent positive signals that the SAARC can still survive and 
prove to be on par with other regional organizations such as ASEAN and the EU in 
fostering economic and political cooperation.  
To this end, the role of India will be instrumental in deciding the fate of the 
SAARC. Equally, other member states will also have to shed their myopic view wherein 
they see hegemonic designs in everything India does. Furthermore, all stakeholders 
should agree to make pragmatic changes in the organization’s Charter, which will enable 
the SAARC to assume a more assertive role in regional cooperation, rather than remain 
just a nominal entity.   
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IV. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: SAARC, EU, AND THE 
ASEAN 
This chapter aims to gain a comparative perspective of the SAARC by drawing 
insights from two other similar regional organizations, the European Union (EU) and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In doing so, it focuses on three issues: 
the genesis of the organizations, the decision-making process, and the embodiment of the 
notion of supra-nationalism versus sovereignty.  
To set the background, the chapter begins with a brief overview of the evolution 
of regionalism as a fairly recent phenomenon in world politics. It will then discuss the 
strategic imperatives in the genesis of the EU and the ASEAN, which were both security 
and economic driven. The chapter then examines the decision-making processes, which 
suggests that both organizations have shown greater ingenuity and pragmatism relative to 
SAARC in dealing with this issue. Finally, the chapter discusses how the issues of 
national sovereignty versus supra-nationality have played out in both cases of the EU and 
the ASEAN. The chapter argues that different historical circumstances of state-formation 
have accordingly shaped the attitudes of ASEAN and EU countries towards the notions 
of state sovereignty and supra-nationalism.  
A. EVOLUTION OF REGIONALISM 
Regionalism is a fairly recent phenomenon in global politics. Initial attempts at 
international cooperation began with a universal approach rather than a regional 
approach.214 In the aftermath of the devastations from the two world wars, the world 
community came together to join hands universally and the United Nations was formed 
as a global institution that would foster global peace and harmony. However, with the 
onset of the Cold War and the resultant bi-polar order in world politics, the vision of a 
universal community living in harmony suddenly became unattainable, if not altogether 
impossible.  
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Many analysts believe that as the world became bi-polar, the countries 
constituting these competing blocs felt the need to restructure the international relations 
within the power blocs in such a way that would enable them to have a voice and 
influence in the international order. Such aspirations induced some countries bounded 
together by regional proximity to come together and join hands in regional cooperation 
initiatives.215 As Citha D. Maass points out, “On the one hand, the idea of universalism 
had turned out to be utopian, while, on the other, the concept of nationalism was regarded 
as too restricted. Thus, a compromise was made by adopting a regional approach, which 
was viewed as being midway between nationalism and universalism.”216 
With the rise in the trends of regional cooperation and integration, regionalism is 
increasingly gaining world attention as a major potential for change in global politics. In 
many parts of the world, regional institutions have evolved as multinational and multi-
lateral organizations that deal with a wide array of transnational issues around the 
world.217 In the European continent, the EU has established itself as a prominent regional 
organization, whereas the ASEAN is increasingly gaining prominence in Southeast Asia. 
B. THE GENESIS OF THE EU 
The EU represents a classic model of regional integration, one that has 
successfully survived and strengthened from the traumatic experiences of the two world 
wars. Founded upon numerous treaties, the EU has undergone expansions that have taken 
it from six founding member states to twenty-eight.218  
The formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), through the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957, can be regarded as the first institutionalized effort in European 
integration. Its aim was to bring about economic integration, including a common market, 
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among its six founding members: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
and West Germany.219 Following a series of expansions, the EU was established to 
succeed the European Community through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.220  
Although economic objectives were seemingly the primary drivers behind the 
West European regional integration, political and security concerns were also equally 
motivating factors. In essence, the regional integration process was a highly political 
process with trade-offs between political autonomy and economic incentives, where each 
country would seek to maintain as much autonomy as possible while seeking as many 
benefits that integration would bring about.221 As William Wallace asserts, “Economic 
integration was a strategy to achieve political objectives: American, French, Dutch, 
Italian, and German.”222  
Politically, a multilateral framework was an appealing incentive for all 
stakeholders. Coming out of the devastations caused by two consecutive world wars, the 
prospect of such a venture with broader regional outlook lent reassurances to France and 
Netherlands, who otherwise felt apprehensive and vulnerable to a resurrecting Germany. 
Interestingly, the security concerns were complemented by Germany and Italy. In the 
wake of their overwhelming defeat by the allied forces, the two countries faced complete 
military and economic destructions and political humiliations. Their democratic 
institutions, in the process of being rebuilt, were not adequately secure and in place. 
Moreover, whatever sovereignties they had managed to regain remained largely 
conditional. Hence, the two countries naturally felt insecure, as they sought to regain their 
footing in such a seemingly precarious environment. In such a scenario, a multilateral 
regional order would provide them a forum through which they could carefully seek to 
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redefine their foreign policy and, in the process, regain acceptance in the international 
community.223  
It is important to note that the United States played a crucial role in facilitating the 
regional integration process in Western Europe. As Wallace points out, “The role of the 
United States as external hegemon and security guarantor was a crucial factor in the 
evolution of the European Community (EC).”224 As the world gradually turned bi-polar 
and the threat of a Cold War loomed large, U.S. interests primarily lay in countering the 
Soviet presence in Western Europe and containing the spread of communism in the 
region. To meet these challenges, it was imperative for the United States to ensure the 
political and economic integrity of the Western European countries, its allies in the 
region. Thus, the United States became heavily involved, through its historic Marshall 
Plan, in the recovery of the European political and economic institutions, which were 
essentially in shambles from the destructions of World War II.225  
The U.S. involvement in framing regional cooperation in Western Europe had 
many positive political and economic implications. For Germany, the U.S. Marshall Plan 
played a critical role in reviving its collapsed economy and reestablishing democratic 
institutions. Most importantly, the U.S. presence in the region was instrumental in 
facilitating an amicable bilateral relationship between France and Germany, as it 
reassured France against a potential hegemony of a revived Germany.226 By virtue of 
being great powers in the region, the Franco-German relationship, thus created, would 
prove to be a key force in the European integration and motivate other countries as well 
to join the regionalism bandwagon. Hence, the U.S. sponsorship in the revival of Western 
Europe, complemented by the European countries’ readiness to accept U.S. leadership on 
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economic and political matters, facilitated an environment that was conducive to a 
successful regional integration.227 
In comparing the genesis of the EU and the SAARC, it appears that the two 
processes were different in many ways. As noted before, SAARC’s formation was 
motivated by a need of smaller countries in the region to counterbalance the rising power 
of a potentially hegemonic India. Such an imperative was lacking in the European 
integration. Despite having political and security concerns, the Western European 
countries did not necessarily feel threatened by any potential regional hegemon. In fact, it 
can be argued that there was not any country left with enough military and economic 
strength to pose a regional threat in the aftermath of the Second World War. For those 
countries, the prospect of a multilateral regional framework was only so important for 
boosting their doomed economies and presenting a united front against a new form of 
external threat—the spread of communism and a potential Soviet invasion. Herein also 
lay another difference—the South Asian countries did not share a common threat 
perception as did the Western European countries against the rising influence of 
communism. Finally, the difference also lay in the absence of any role of an external 
power in SAARC’s formation, which was predominant in the European integration.  
C. THE ASEAN PERSPECTIVE 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established through 
the initiatives of five countries in the region: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand on 8 August 1967.228 Since its formation, the organization has 
expanded its membership to 10 countries with the accession of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam. The proclaimed aims of the ASEAN included 
accelerating economic growth, social progress, socio-cultural evolution among its 
members, and protection of regional peace and stability.229 
227 Wallace, Regional Integration: The West European Experience, 9. 
228 Amitabh Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 155. 
229 Ibid., 156. 
 59 
                                                 
The political impetus for forming a regional body in Southeast Asia primarily 
came from the rising influence of communist threats in the region. The Indo-Chinese 
states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia had all fallen to communist regimes, and 
communist insurrections were threatening other countries in the region as well. The 
whole region was ideologically divided into two groups: the non-communist states of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand and the communist states 
of Indo-China.230  
In such a precarious setting, ASEAN’s founding members were naturally 
concerned with the potential impacts of communist expansionism on their nationalistic 
movements, which were still in nascent stages.231 It should be noted that as incipient 
nations, it was highly important for ASEAN countries to preserve their newly found 
national identities against any forms of expansionism.232 A potential radical political 
change could prove to be a major setback in their nation-building processes. Hence, such 
shared political and ideological concerns presented a strong incentive for ASEAN 
founding members to unite with each other in a regional alliance. As Acharya notes, “The 
similarities of their domestic political orientation and a common fear of communist-led 
national liberation movements provided important glue for ASEAN.”233   
Conversely, the political and ideological divide deterred non-conformist 
Southeast Asian nations to shun the concept of a regional alliance. Despite an open-door 
invitation, laid out clearly in ASEAN’s founding statement, the Bangkok Declaration of 
1967, the Indo-Chinese communist states collectively declined to join the regional 
venture.234 Cambodia did not want to join because it regarded it as a pro-Western and 
anti-Chinese organization. In the face of an existential threat from neighboring Vietnam, 
Cambodia did not want to upset China, upon which it relied for political and military 
support. The country felt especially vulnerable as it had broken ties with the United 
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States.235 Moreover, Cambodia was also deterred by the prospect of upsetting its 
perpetual regional adversary, Vietnam, which had already indicated its reservation 
regarding the formation of ASEAN and had starkly refused to join the organization.236 
Similarly, Myanmar also rejected the proposal of joining ASEAN because of its 
perceived pro-West underpinnings and the fear of upsetting China. Officially, Myanmar 
laid forth the presence of U.S. military presence in the Philippines as the reason for its 
refusal to join ASEAN.237 Thus, despite the best efforts of ASEAN leaders to enthuse 
greater regional cooperation, the organization was compelled to set off with only five 
members in its formative years. 
In addition to the political and ideological conflicts, ASEAN’s founding members 
were also motivated by a myriad of security concerns to form a regional alliance. As the 
region became decolonized, the transition to a post-colonial era also created a power 
vacuum, thus rendering the newly formed Southeast Asian countries vulnerable in a 
potentially hostile environment. In this regard, Chaudhury notes, “As most of the 
Southeast Asian states were dependent on their security arrangements on the colonial 
masters, decolonization meant for them not only weakening but also diminishing of their 
own security guarantees.”238  
The security challenges involved both regional and outside threats. Regionally, 
threats emanated from each other, owing to a number of territorial disputes, which were 
left unresolved by the former colonial powers.239 Moreover, the rising power and 
influence of a communist North Vietnam presented a prominent security challenge in the 
region. These security concerns were lent further credence by the U.S. domino theory, 
which suggested that if South Vietnam fell under the communist control, other countries 
in the region would fall too, like dominoes, to communist domination.240  
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Interestingly, security threats also emanated from one of the ASEAN founding 
members itself, Indonesia. Under Sukarno, the first president, Indonesia largely regarded 
itself as a dominant regional power and pursued a regional policy of confrontation or 
Konfrontasi with its regional neighbors.241 Such an attitude naturally made other 
countries apprehensive of the regional power’s motives, making political reconciliation a 
difficult prospect in the region. Singapore especially felt vulnerable in such a regional 
setting. As a small and newly formed state after its separation from the Malaysian 
Federation in 1965, the island republic felt quite exposed and powerless, caught between 
a bitter Malaysia and hegemonic Indonesia.242  
In this strategic backdrop, the regional stakeholders understandably shared a 
common interest to pacify Indonesia. This goal could be achieved by engaging Indonesia 
in a regional framework in which the regional power was accorded a prominent role. This 
regional mindset is succinctly described by one analyst in this way: 
Indonesia’s membership in ASEAN would reduce the possibility of threat 
to their security posed by their giant neighbor … Indonesia would appear 
to be placed in what amounts to a “hostage” position, albeit in a golden 
cage.243 
Hence, similar to SAARC, albeit to a lesser degree, ASEAN can also be regarded 
as an outcome of the need of smaller powers in a region to counter-balance a potential 
hegemon. As such, ASEAN was different than the EU case, as the latter was not induced 
by the imperative to counterbalance any regional hegemon.   
It should be noted that despite the strategic need to enmesh the regional power in 
a multilateral framework, Indonesia’s participation in the regional process came to 
fruition only after a seemingly radical change in the country’s leadership brought about 
by the fall of Sukarno, and the advent of the New Order regime under President 
Soeharto.244 The new political order set significantly different priorities in domestic and 
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foreign policy areas, which created a positive environment for regional cooperation. In 
contrast to the strategy of confrontation, Soeharto saw greater benefits in presenting 
Indonesia as a benevolent neighbor in the region and was more positive towards the 
notion of a regional alliance. Moreover, in addition to economic and developmental 
potential, the new president also saw a potential for Indonesia to express its leadership 
through such a forum. With such an agreeable mindset, the new president would become 
a strong supporter of a regional alliance.245  
Besides regional threats, ASEAN founding members were also motivated by a 
need to form an alliance to counter external threats, which primarily came from the 
emergence of China as a potential regional hegemon. In this context, the founding 
members of ASEAN shared two-fold security concerns: a long-term security threat to the 
regional stability posed by a rising China and an immediate threat to their domestic 
political orders posed by the infusion of communist ideology in the region by China. 
Long-term wise, Indonesia and Malaysia were particularly concerned with China’s 
potential to become a dominant power in the region.246 As Acharya notes, “The prospect 
of China emerging as the dominant force in the region—and the related prospect of 
Southeast Asia becoming to her what the Caribbean is to America or Eastern Europe to 
the USSR—was one aspect of ASEAN members’ collective apprehensions.”247 For the 
non-communist Southeast Asian countries, China was the primary instigator of turmoil in 
the region, which it allegedly did by supporting the regime in North Vietnam and fuelling 
communist insurgencies in their countries.248 In this context, the genesis of ASEAN 
bears similarity with the EU, as both processes were influenced by a shared threat 
perception emanating from outside the region. 
Thus, it becomes evident that ASEAN’s formation was not only driven by 
economic concerns but security concerns as well. The relative importance of security 
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imperatives was stressed by Adam Malik, the third vice-president of Indonesia and a key 
player in the founding of ASEAN: 
Although from the outset ASEAN was conceived as an organization for 
economic, social and cultural cooperation, and although considerations in 
these fields were no doubt central, it was the fact that there was a 
convergence in the political outlook of the five prospective member-
nations, both with regard to national priority objectives as on the question 
of how best to secure these objectives in the emergent strategic 
configuration of East Asia, which provided the main stimulus to join 
together in ASEAN … Whether consciously or unconsciously, 
considerations of national and regional security also figured largely in the 
minds of the founders of the ASEAN.249 
D. ASEAN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS  
The decision-making process in the ASEAN is based on the premises of 
consultation (Musyawarah) and consensus (Muafakat).250 Musyawarah is a Malay, 
Indonesian, and Brunei term which refers to the practice of arriving at decisions through 
prolonged discussions and consultations through sharing of ideas or opinions and 
Muafakat refers to consensus that is reached through such process or Musyawarah.251 In 
political matters, consensus or Muafakat is strictly required; whereas in economic 
matters, modifications, or certain flexibility, are permissible.252 The origin of such 
mechanism of decision-making was rooted in traditional practices followed in tribal 
communities in certain parts of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.253  
The complementing features of consultation and consensus have allowed a greater 
degree of flexibility in ASEAN decision-making process. With greater flexibility, 
member states can maneuver around difficult and contentious issues. Even in cases where 
it is difficult to reach a common agreement, the participants will unequivocally agree to 
lay off the decision for later consultations. Instead of publicly voicing disagreements, 
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member states will agree to discuss them behind closed door until some forms of 
agreement can be reached.254 Such provisions are supposedly designed to help maintain 
trust and good-relations. 
Notwithstanding its tendency to be a slow process, the shelving of disagreements 
for later settlement has allowed ASEAN members to enmesh each other in the regional 
process. As regional cooperation measures invariably entail making complex decisions, 
such a methodical approach allows sufficient time for member states to resolve 
conflicting issues and arrive at a consensus without derailing the overall process. For 
example, when there was disagreement over the idea of neutrality proposed by Malaysia, 
instead of totally discarding the concept, ASEAN members underwent prolonged 
consultations over the matter. By “agreeing to disagree,” they could finally reach a 
consensus to form the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971.255 
To their credit, ASEAN members have also agreed to the provision of third-party 
mediation in complex decision-making processes. Although such a provision was not 
formally accepted previously, it appears this mechanism is now generally well-accepted 
by all ASEAN members, especially in dealing with long standing disputes such as 
territorial ones.256 In settling territorial disputes such as Pedra Blanca between Malaysia 
and Singapore and that of Ligitan and Sipadan between Malaysia and Indonesia, the 
concerned stakeholders agreed to present the cases in the International Court of Justice. 
Implicit in such agreements was the understanding that the states would accept the 
decisions of the Court.257 Incorporation of such provision has proved to be an important 
step towards resolving contentious regional issues. 
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E. EU DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
In the case of West European integration, through a series of hard-lessons learned, 
the European stakeholders finally managed to strike a fine balance between the 
provisions of unanimity and majority voting in their decision-making process. Initially, 
the European Economic Community (EEC) required all decisions to be unanimous. 
Attempts to incorporate the provision of majority voting were met with objections by one 
or the other member states, which essentially paralyzed the decision-making process. As 
Jonathan Golub notes,  
The entire period preceding the institutional reforms initiated in 1987, in 
fact, is commonly characterized as the “dark age” of the EEC or an era of 
“Euroscerosis”—a time of meagre legislative output marked by a painful 
slowness of decisions because instead of playing by the formal treaty rule, 
the need for unanimity on all decisions taken by the Council of Ministers 
had led to political paralysis in the Council.258 
The institutional reforms, as mentioned by Golub, came through the signing of the 
Single European Act (SEA), which ingeniously reinforced the provision of majority 
voting in the decision-making process. The act, signed in 1986 and put in effect in July 
1987, incorporated the provision for a qualified majority vote (QMV) while making 
decisions on pre-identified areas and issues.259 Through the provision, member states 
were allocated a set number of votes, based on country size. Accordingly, the UK, 
France, and Germany and Italy have 10 votes each, Spain has eight; Belgium, Greece, the 
Netherlands and Portugal five each; Austria and Sweden four each; Denmark, Finland 
and Ireland three each; and Luxembourg two.260 In order to arrive at a decision under the 
QMV, five-sevenths of the total weighted votes are always mandatory, which amount to 
62 votes out of the total of 87. To counter, the opposition would require a minimum of 26 
votes, meaning at least three states should participate.261 By checking individual 
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country’s power of veto, the provision of QMV has thus finally helped to resolve the 
impasse in the EU decision-making process.  
F. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SUPRA-NATIONALITY 
The essence of regionalism lies in the disposition of member states to give up a 
certain degree of their state sovereignty to a larger supra-national authority, as a trade-off 
for political, economic, and social betterments. Advocates of such forms of regional 
integration argue that member countries can avail to better incentives because the 
supranational authority, in effect, can pool individual national resources for a larger 
cause. Moreover, the advocates debate the relevancy and rationality of the concept of 
state-sovereignty, which they claim has become obsolete in an increasingly 
interdependent world, where no state can truly claim absolute authority in all its 
affairs.262 Also, the creation of interdependence through such a trans-national order holds 
great significance in reducing the probability of conflicts by making the opportunity cost 
of war prohibitively high.  
History plays an influential role in shaping the attitude and disposition of 
countries towards the notions of sovereignty and supra-nationalism. More specifically, 
the history of the state formation manifests in a particular socio-cultural, economic, and 
strategic mindset, which determines how the states in the concerned region develop their 
views with regards to the nuances of regionalism.263  
Viewed in this context, it can be argued that the European legacy of making and 
breaking alliances with each other has manifested in a strategic mindset, which makes the 
European states not particularly fixated on the notion of state-sovereignty. Conversely, a 
historical legacy of colonialism has manifested in a strategic mindset among ASEAN 
countries that is sensitive towards their new-found sovereignty and averse to the notion of 
supra-nationalism.  
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Thus, the Europeans have arguably developed more tolerance to the notion of 
supra-nationalism, which they feel is commensurate with the need to make pragmatic 
choices. As S. F. Goodman puts it, “Too much dwelling on theoretical ideas of 
sovereignty is, to [EU countries], a waste of time.”264 With this favorable disposition, the 
EU countries have been successful in developing an ingenious amalgam of flexible 
compromises on how much national power to be retained by individual member states, as 
compared to how much centralized community power the supranational authority will be 
accorded.265 As Chaudhury asserts, “The concept of partial surrender of national 
sovereignty on the part of the member-states is a landmark in the development of the 
process of regional cooperation that helps Europe to emerge as a very unique model of 
integration.”266  
In institutionalizing the complex relationship between a supranational authority 
and state sovereignty, the EU has evolved into a viable political and economic 
community. In the process, the EU countries have succeeded in developing a strong set of 
institutions that underpin shared norms and values of the European Community. Most 
prominently, the European Commission, as a transnational authority, represents the 
Community as a whole in the international arena. Besides the Commission, the EU has an 
independent European Parliament, which regulates the work of the Commission. There is 
also a European Court of Justice (ECJ), which has emerged as a supranational legal 
institution. Free from national interference, the ECJ strengthens the legitimacy of the 
Community over the member-states.267 Finally, the adoption of a common currency 
“euro” has sent the ultimate signals to the international community of EU countries’ 
resolve to adopt supra-nationalism. As Chaudhury asserts, “The adaptation of the 
European common currency, Euro makes it clear that, for the sake of their own benefits, 
the member-states of the European Union have become ready to compromise their 
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national sovereignty with the supra-national authority of the European Community.”268 
In doing so, the EU has clearly established itself as an epitome of regional integration.   
G. SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS SUPRA-NATIONALITY: THE ASEAN 
EXPERIENCE 
As noted earlier, in the ASEAN scenario, the newly formed Southeast Asian 
countries shared a strategic mindset that was skeptical to the notion of giving up any 
degree of state sovereignty to a supra-national authority. Having just come out of the 
shackles of colonialism and faced with a myriad of security concerns, the incipient 
countries harbored much sensitivity towards their new-found sovereignty. As a result, the 
ASEAN countries were not willing to compromise on this issue, neither by shedding any 
forms of sovereignty to a supra-national body or by interfering in each other’s internal 
affairs.269 For them, the primary concerns laid in protecting their newly gained 
sovereignty. 
The principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs particularly 
reflects the sensitivity of ASEAN community towards state-sovereignty. The Declaration 
of Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 recognized the right of 
every state—large or small—to be free from external interference in its internal affairs. 
The general assumption was that external interferences would adversely affect the states’ 
independence, sovereignty, and integrity.270 It was also believed that the insistence on 
non-interference would help them to focus on their respective nation-building efforts and 
achieve national resilience. This, in turn, would give greater resilience to the ASEAN 
regional order in the long run.271  
It can be argued that ASEAN members’ refusal to surrender state sovereignty to a 
supra-national authority reflects that they were less committed in creating a political and 
economic community as one finds in the European integration. Rather, they favored the 
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creation of a “diplomatic community,” which in essence would allow the countries to 
enmesh each other in the regionalism process.272 As Chaudhury explains, “The key 
aspect of this approach is that it focuses not so much on the substance of the inter-state 
interaction, but on the ‘process,’ a process, which is ‘non-confrontational’ and designed 
to build comfort and mutual trust.”273 The focus remained on keeping the regionalism 
process as protracted as possible, yet not committing to an extent that would compromise 
individual sovereignty.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The genesis of both the EU and the ASEAN reveals that security concerns were 
key motivators in establishing the two regional organizations. Both the EU and the 
ASEAN countries were driven by a strategic need to present a united front against 
security threats that emanated from both within and outside the region. In Western 
Europe, coming out of the destruction of the Second World War, it was the potential 
threat posed by a resurgent Germany. In Southeast Asia, it was the need to pacify a 
hegemonic Indonesia, which pursued a policy of confrontation of Konfrontasi with its 
neighbors. These security imperatives display a great similarity with what one finds in 
South Asia, where smaller SAARC states perceived security threats emanating from 
India, the presumed regional hegemon. 
However, unlike SAARC, where member countries did not share any common 
external threats, both the EU and the ASEAN countries faced such threats. In Western 
Europe, the threat emanated from a malevolent Soviet Union that was spreading its 
tentacles in the European Continent and beyond. Likewise, China’s emergence as a 
hegemonic power presented a long-term threat to regional stability for ASEAN countries.  
The EU experience also shows the importance of the role of an outside power in 
facilitating the regionalism process. The U.S. role in Western Europe was a key in this 
regard. U.S. sponsorship, which was equally complemented by the willingness of the EU 
countries to accept U.S. leadership in the region, was crucial in paving the road to a 
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successful integration. However, such an outside role is lacking in the regionalism 
processes both in Southeast Asia and South Asia. This distinctive lack of any 
international role can be attributed to the reluctance of both ASEAN and SAARC states 
to accept outside interference in regional matters. Hence, it can be argued, as purely 
home-grown regional enterprises, both SAARC and the ASEAN have lagged relatively 
behind in the regionalism process. 
In the realm of decision-making, the EU again takes the lead by showing 
ingenuity and pragmatism. After their spate with ineffective decision-makings under the 
provision of unanimity, the EU countries finally devised an ingenious way in which they 
incorporated a system of majority voting that provided the EU sufficient leverage to 
make important decisions.  
On the other hand, the ASEAN decision-making process, although flexible, 
cannot be considered as effective as the EU process. Rooted in the traditional premises of 
consultation (Musyawarah) and consensus (Muafakat), the ASEAN decision-making 
process is more focused on not offending each other’s sensitivities and avoiding directly 
dealing with any contentious issues. As a protracted process, it only allows for member 
countries to enmesh each other in the regionalism process without resolving any key 
issues. Yet, it can be argued that compared with the SAARC process, the ASEAN 
process fares better, as the latter discusses contentious issues, the discussion of which are 
categorically prohibited in the SAARC process.    
In dealing with the notions of sovereignty and supra-nationalism, the European 
countries have again been more forthcoming and accommodating than their ASEAN and 
SAARC counterparts. With a strategic mindset that favored a trade-off between 
sovereignty and supra-nationalism, the EU countries have readily embodied the concept 
of supra-nationalism as a pragmatic choice for an overarching cause of regional 
empowerment. Accordingly, they have developed a strong set of supra-national 
institutions, making the EU an epitome of regional integration.    
In contrast, ASEAN countries have largely shown apprehension towards the 
notion of supra-nationalism. Coming out of a colonial legacy, the Southeast Asian 
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countries have remained unwilling to compromise on their new found sovereignty to any 
form of supra-national authority. In being sensitive towards state-sovereignty, ASEAN 
countries have essentially favored a more diplomatic community rather than a political 
and economic community, as in the EU. Such attitude is more akin to SAARC, where 
similar myopic viewpoint toward supra-nationalism prevails. 
Thus, the prevalence of such a rigid mindset among SAARC and ASEAN 
countries appears to be quite a vexing problem, as it is fairly obvious that the fullest 
potentials of regional cooperation cannot be realized without relinquishing some degree 
of sovereignty to a supra-national authority. Yet, the problem is not insurmountable if the 
stakeholders are willing to make compromises, at least in part. SAARC and ASEAN 
countries can make some headway by differentiating economic and political agendas and 
accepting the terms of a supra-national authority in pre-identified areas of cooperation. In 
the long run, this may lead to an evolution in their mindset towards accepting the notion 
of supra-nationalism.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Regionalism is no longer uncharted territory in global politics, notwithstanding its 
recent history. As the EU and ASEAN experiences have shown, regional efforts can be a 
positive sum game if all stakeholders make wholehearted commitments. From economic 
and security viewpoints, regional integration holds great potential to transform a region. 
This potential is crucial in the case of South Asia, where endemic poverty and an acute 
lack of adequate physical infrastructure make it difficult, if not impossible, for a majority 
of South Asian countries to undergo sustained economic growth on their own. Hence, it 
becomes evident that South Asian countries are better off choosing cooperation over non-
cooperation, as the costs of choosing the latter are high.274   
South Asian countries embarked on their journey of regionalism with the 
formation of SAARC in 1985. However, despite raised hopes with its establishment, 
SAARC has failed to deliver on its promises and has left much to be desired. In its life 
span of almost three decades, SAARC has achieved minimal regional integration, earning 
it a reputation as a mere talking shop, where member states are engaged in formalities 
only. Failures to enhance each other’s development and security through regional 
cooperation have resulted in a low human development index, which is reflected in 
statistics showing the child mortality rate in South Asia ranking below Sub-Saharan 
Africa along with increased incidences of cross-border human-trafficking and 
terrorism.275 Furthermore, despite a huge economic potential, regional trade amounts to 
only 5 percent of the total trade in South Asia, compared to 26 percent in Southeast 
Asia.276   
As has been discussed, a major impediment in achieving regional integration has 
been the power asymmetry between India and other smaller South Asian countries. The 
advent of power asymmetry, which established India as the dominant power in the 
274 Ummu Salma Bava, “Regional Integration: Lessons for South Asia from around the World,” in 
Does South Asia Exist, 49.  
275 Dossani, Sneider, and Sood, “Does South Asia Exist?,” 15.    
276 Ibid. 
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region, generated an environment of discord that has not been conducive for regional 
cooperation. As it assumed itself the rightful heir to the British Raj, India aspired to 
assume regional leadership in a post-colonial South Asia. Accordingly, its regional 
policies became largely focused on maintaining a dominant posture and assertive policy 
towards its neighbors.277 Not surprisingly, the perception of India as a hegemonic power 
instilled a perennial sense of mistrust and apprehension in the smaller countries vis-à-vis 
India’s motives. The trust deficit, thus developed, has resulted in varying degrees of 
conflictual relationships between India and almost all its neighbors. Most prominently, 
the Indo-Pakistan conflict stands out as an epitome of enduring rivalry. The two nuclear-
armed adversaries have fought four major wars and countless border skirmishes, without 
solving any of the key issues.  
The power asymmetry has also impeded the creation of an important role for 
SAARC in enhancing regional cooperation. Ironically, the very circumstances that 
induced smaller states in South Asia to form a regional organization to counterbalance a 
hegemonic India also created conditions that would prove to be setbacks for SAARC’s 
role. In their bid to enmesh India in a multilateral forum, the smaller countries were 
forced to comply with all the preconditions laid out by an apprehensive India.  
At India’s behest, SAARC had to incorporate two self-defeating provisions in its 
charter: the provision of unanimity in decision-making, and the exclusion of bilateral and 
contentious issues from SAARC’s agenda. The two provisions have, in effect, been 
serious impediments to SAARC’s functions. As the EU countries learned their lessons 
the hard way—that it is difficult to arrive at a total consensus on regional matters—they 
had to make amendments in their decision-making process accordingly. However, 
SAARC members have so far been unable to show the same level of ingenuity and 
pragmatism in this regard.  
In the same vein, SAARC has not been able to contribute in any meaningful way 
towards solving longstanding bilateral disputes. As the organization is categorically 
barred from pursuing these issues, it has been forced to remain a passive bystander. As a 
277 Khan, “Security Impediments to Regionalism in South Asia,” in Does South Asia Exist, 228. 
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consequence, these disputes, most notably the ones between India and Pakistan, remain 
extant. As such, it can be argued that SAARC represents a lost opportunity in promoting 
regional peace and stability in South Asia.  
On an optimistic note, despite all the setbacks, regional integration is slowly 
gaining momentum and its prospect is looking increasingly feasible in the days ahead. In 
yet another ironic way, the positive development can be attributed to the very power 
asymmetry which has so far impeded the process. As India continues to grow 
economically and militarily, the power asymmetry has actually grown further. However, 
the newfound growth has enabled India to slowly change its perception towards 
regionalism. As India grows more confident, it has come to view regional integration in 
new light, as less of an impediment to its strategic interests. As Navnita Chadha Behera 
notes, “Indian leadership understands that India can no longer be held back, and the 
world will engage with India irrespective of its neighbors. This has become another 
reason for India to strengthen SAARC.”278  
Indian commitment to regional growth was also reflected in the comments of 
India’s erstwhile Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. He said, “India cannot prosper 
and progress without its neighboring countries also prospering, and progressing, in equal 
measure … [and] historically the South Asian region has flourished the most when it has 
been connected to itself, and to the rest of the world.”279 As noted previously, the recent 
proclamation by the incumbent Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also reflects 
similar positive commitment towards regionalism in South Asia. Correspondingly, the 
perceptions of the other South Asian countries have also undergone similar changes. For 
them, cooperation with a stronger and economically robust India has become even more 
valuable, promising great rewards.  
The only concern remains the perennial animosity between India and Pakistan. 
Even if both parties acknowledge the need for regional cooperation to achieve sustainable 
278 Navnita Chadha Behera, “SAARC and Beyond: Civil Society and Regional Integration in South 
Asia,” in Regional Integration and Economic Development in South Asia (Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Inc., 2012), 5.  
279 Ibid. 
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development and alleviate millions of people from the depths of poverty, the countries’ 
leaderships still have to undergo a change in their mindset. It will be a test for India, as to 
how much concession it is willing to make to get Pakistan onboard in the drive towards 
regionalism. On its part, Pakistan should be willing make similar concession, if it wants 
to reap the benefits of regional cooperation. As Akmal Hussain notes, “Suffering an 
adversarial relationship with one’s neighbor can no longer be the emblem of patriotism. 
Instead, cooperation and regional unity through plurality promise to guide the region—
and the world—into a new dawn.”280  
Compared to SAARC, the EU has fared much better as a regional organization. A 
vanguard of the regionalism process, the EU has also established itself as an epitome of 
supranational authority in world politics. Besides economic imperatives, a shared threat 
perception emanating from a malevolent Soviet Union motivated the Western European 
states to unite with each other. Similarly, the role of the United States was crucial in 
facilitating the integration process in Europe. U.S. sponsorship, complemented by the 
disposition of the European countries to accept U.S. leadership in the region, presented 
strong regional dynamics that were conducive to regional cooperation. Moreover, the 
willingness of European countries to surrender some degree of state sovereignty to a 
supranational authority was a key factor in fast-tracking European integration. Equally, 
the EU’s success can be attributed to the ingenuity and pragmatism of the European 
countries in incorporating relevant changes in the organization’s charter, such as 
amending the faulty decision-making process.  
On a similar note, ASEAN has also fared better than SAARC. In its almost five 
decades of existence, the association has earned itself a strong standing in regional and 
international forums. Through proactive engagements, ASEAN has succeeded in 
enmeshing regional as well as international actors in its regional process. For ASEAN 
countries, the need to form a regional alliance came from two imperatives. First, it was 
the need to pacify a potentially hegemonic Indonesia. Second, it was the strategic need to 
present a united front against an emerging China. In its evolution, ASEAN has shown 
280 Hussain, “The Challenges and Drivers of Regionalism in South Asia,” in Does South Asia Exist, 
166. 
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greater flexibility in including regional countries into its domain, which has generated a 
positive regional environment. Also, its reliance on the premises of consultation and 
consensus for decision-making has allowed a greater degree of flexibility in maneuvering 
around difficult and contentious regional issues. However, ASEAN members, similar to 
SAARC states, have been largely uncompromising towards the notion of relinquishing 
any degree of sovereignty to a supra-national authority. As can be inferred, this has been 
a setback to an otherwise promising process of regional integration.    
One can draw important lessons from the experiences of the three regional 
organizations—SAARC, EU, and the ASEAN—on the impacts of power asymmetry in 
regionalism. The SAARC experience demonstrates that an asymmetric power balance 
can be unfavorable for regional integration by negatively impacting its 
institutionalization. It also appears that if the power disparities are significantly high, as 
in South Asia, the imperatives become stronger for smaller countries to take measures to 
offset the power imbalances. Arguably, the power imbalances were not great enough to 
stimulate such behaviors in Western Europe. Similarly, EU and ASEAN experiences 
show that a regional hegemon can show a positive attitude if its threat perception 
becomes similar to the regional neighbors. West Germany changed its attitude when 
faced with the Soviet threat, and Indonesia embraced regional cooperation in the face of a 
common threat emanating from an emerging China. Another lesson that can be drawn is 
that a regional hegemon becomes more likely to support regionalism if it sees its strategic 
interests are better served through the process. Both Indonesia and West Germany 
realized that their strategic interests were better aligned with regional imperatives. In 
SAARC’s case, India did not see any political or economic incentives in cooperating with 
its neighbors, causing it to seek cooperation outside the region. A last point, which may 
appear obvious, is that a regional hegemon has to be reasonably certain that its smaller 
neighbors are not colluding behind its back. The smaller South Asian countries were not 
quite able to convince India in this regard, causing India to make unreasonable demands 
for institutionalizing SAARC.  
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Based on the discussions herein, some policy recommendations to promote the 
role of SAARC and achieve regional cooperation in South Asia are outlined as follows.  
1. As suggested earlier, if SAARC is to be converted into a vibrant and 
effective organization, first and foremost, it will require fundamental 
reorientation of the mindset of the regional stakeholders. To this end, the 
role of India will be instrumental in deciding SAARC’s fate. Hence, India 
will have to forego its ambivalent regional policy and take a purposeful 
lead in regional integration versus only seeking dominance. Equally, other 
member states will have to shed their myopic view wherein they see 
hegemonic designs in everything India does. If they want to achieve 
regional integration, smaller countries should be willing to accept the 
inevitability of India’s centrality and potential in this regard.  
 
2. Commensurate with changing attitudes, SAARC countries should also 
make positive efforts to reevaluate their security perceptions. Although 
threats emanating from regional sources remain a primary security 
concern, it should be realized that in most cases, such threats may have 
been exaggerated to protect vested interests of South Asian elites. 
Moreover, harping too much about external security threats comes at the 
cost of genuine internal security threats such as poverty, corruption, and 
inequitable growth, which have actually been downplayed.281  
 
3. To make SAARC a functional organization, it is imperative to make 
amendments in SAARC’s faulty Charter that calls for unanimous 
decision-making. In this regard, SAARC can draw lessons from the EU 
experience. Similar to the EU, SAARC can incorporate the provision of 
majority voting in predetermined issue areas while retaining the provision 
of unanimity. To start, SAARC can incorporate such provisions in 
economic agendas while leaving political issues to be decided through 
existing processes.   
 
4. SAARC should also not shy away from discussing bilateral and 
contentious issues. In this regard, the ASEAN process of consultation to 
arrive at a consensus can be a good way to make a beginning. Similar to 
the ASEAN practices, SAARC members should encourage consultations 
instead of totally discarding any contentious issues, so that even if 
immediate solutions cannot be found, they can reach an agreement to 
shelve the issues for future consultations. Such measures can prove to be 
beneficial in minimizing the trust deficit that plagues the region.  
 
 
281 Kumar, “Is a Successful SAARC an Imperative,” in Does South Asia Exist, 110.  
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5. SAARC should attempt to involve global powers such as the United States 
in its regional affairs, both economically and politically. So far, the region 
has not been able to garner meaningful U.S. interest, which can be 
attributed to SAARC members’ inability to present a united front and 
India’s hesitancy on engaging outside parties in regional affairs. However, 
with a warming relationship between India and the United States, the 
environment may have become favorable to attract U.S. interest in the 
region. Besides economic issues, the United States may be willing to exert 
its resources on other issues that also impact its national interests, such as 
building democratic institutions, enhancing security cooperation, 
developing intelligence links, and encouraging cooperation in narcotics 
and terrorism issues.282  
 
6. It is obvious that SAARC members will not be willing to shed their state 
sovereignty to any supra-national authority to the extent that has been 
achieved in the European integration. The problem becomes vexing as the 
South Asian predisposition derives primarily from a cultural mindset, 
which zealously guards sovereignty. However, the problem is not 
insurmountable if SAARC members are willing to make compromises, at 
least in part. They can make some headway by differentiating between 
economic and political agendas. In so doing, a compromise can be made to 
accept the provision of a supra-national authority in pre-identified 
economic areas of cooperation. Such measures should also be 
complemented by efforts to allocate adequate and robust authority to the 
SAARC’s Secretariat, which is currently functioning as a nominal entity 
with minimal authority. It is also important to fill the Secretariat positions 
with professional experts, which currently may not be the case. Increasing 
the pay and incentives can prove useful in attracting competent candidates 
to assume the Secretariat positions.283  In the long run, such measures 
may lead to an evolution in the mindset of South Asian countries towards 
accepting the notion of supra-nationalism.  
282 Xenia Dormandy, “U.S. Attitudes toward South Asian Regionalism,” in Does South Asia Exist, 
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